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[T]he [C]ourt's doctrinal realignment of the federal-state structure is of
little interest to most Americans. It recalls memories of dreary high
school civics classes, and for the most part fascinates only legal scholars,
who regularly churn out a welter of arcane, impenetrable tomes on the
subject, which they call federalism.**
I. INTRODUCTION
In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett' the Supreme
Court ruled that a private individual may not recover money damages against
a state in a suit brought under Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act
(ADA) because Congress did not validly abrogate the States' sovereign im-
munity in that title of the ADA.2 Garrett is the seventh Supreme Court deci-
sion in the past six terms to have so dispatched a federal statute that
endeavored to abrogate state immunity from suit in federal court.3 Together,
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1. 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994).
Title I bars disability-based discrimination in employment by both private employers and
public entities. In the lower courts, Garrett had alleged violations of both ADA Titles I
and II. Whether Title It of the ADA, dealing with "services, programs, or activities of a
public entity," 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994), is available to public employees for claims of
disability-based employment discrimination is unsettled.
See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 960 n.1. Because the parties had not briefed the statutory
issue, the Supreme Court in Garrett, which had granted certiorari on the constitutionality
under Section 5 of both ADA Titles I and II, dismissed the Title II portion of the writ as
improvidently granted. See id.
3. In addition to Garrett, see, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
(Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA), 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)); Kimel v. Flor-
ida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),
29 U.S.C. § 630 (b) (1994)); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (two Sections of the Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clar-
ification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296(a) (1994)) [hereinafter College Savings Bank 1];
College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999) (The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994)) [hereinaf-
ter College Savings Bank II]; City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(bb) (1994); Seminole Tribe of
Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2701-21; 18
U.S.C. § 1166-68 (1994)). In addition, in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999), the Court
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these cases have rewritten the rules regulating Congress' abrogation author-
ity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 That alone is remarka-
ble. In addition to these seven cases, the Court in recent years has declared
twice that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power by regulating non-
economic intrastate activity touching areas of traditional local concern.5
Moreover, the Court twice has struck down federal statutes on the ground
that Congress unconstitutionally had "commandeered" either state legisla-
tive 6 or executive processes 7 as a means of enforcing federal law. s
More than just a Section 5 case, Garrett is the most recent chapter in a
federalism revival. 9 The cases in this string of remarkable and ambitious fed-
eralism decisions have all been decided by a slim but sturdy five-member
held that state judicial immunity also extends to suits against the state in its own courts.
See discussion infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. This Section provides, "Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." These cases represent
a recent retreat from the lenient judicial scrutiny Congress previously enjoyed when enact-
ing legislation enforcing Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Compare Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (holding that the Section 5 power empowers the Congress to
proscribe activities not themselves violations of equal protection of the laws when the pro-
scription is reasonably calculated to remedy or prevent other violations of equal protec-
tion) with Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508 (holding that while the Section 5 power is not limited
just to proscribing state action already barred by the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress
lacks power to use the Section 5 power for any other purpose unless the activity regulated
has a "congruence and proportionality" to behavior the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits).
5. The Court's recent Commerce Clause cases of United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) and Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598, depart from the longstanding deference to Con-
gress' exercise of its commerce power. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (discussing that Congress possesses the power to
regulate intrastate activities through its power to regulate interstate commerce when the
Congress has a rational basis for concluding that the intrastate activity substantially bur-
dens interstate commerce); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (stating that -the
well-established commerce power doctrine holds that to establish the rational basis for
concluding that an activity substantially burdens commerce, Congress may aggregate the
individual adverse effects on commerce produced by each actor within the class of actors
that a particular federal statute regulates); see also Heart of Atlanta Hotel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
6. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding Congress cannot
compel the states to enact a federal regulatory program).
7. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress can-
not "issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the
States' officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program.").
8. See Matthew D. Adler, State Sovereignty and the Anti-Commandeering Cases, in
THE SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM: REAL OR IMAGINED, THE ANNALS OF THE AMERI-
CAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 158, 158-70 (Frank Goodman ed.,
2001).
9. Richard Fallon has demonstrated that the court also has used a federalist interpre-
tive framework to penetrate the law regulating res judicata, collateral estoppel, and habeas
corpus. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141, 1172-87 (1988). The Court's 1971 decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
marks the beginning of this revival. See Fallon at 1168-69. See also Ann Althouse, Inside
the Federalism Cases: Concern About the Federal Courts, in THE SUPREME COURT'S FED-
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conservative majority.10 They are a striking departure from the Court's pre-
vious understanding of the Constitution's architecture distributing power be-
tween the federal and state governments." Their common theme is that the
congressional actions the Court has repudiated are "fundamentally incom-
patible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty."'1 2 To mix meta-
phors, this federalism train has left the station and is on a fast track.
Understanding the new federalism is not for the faint of heart. How best
to police the boundaries of federal and state authority within "our system of
dual sovereignty" is a challenge as old as the Constitution.1 3 The effort has
been characterized as a "national neurosis.' 1 4 Some have found the resulting
twists and turns impenetrable.1 5 That said, there are some markers to guide
one. In this article, I focus on the Section 5 branch of the federalism revival,
the branch that was at issue in Garrett and the one that is most likely to arise
when litigating on behalf of or against an arm of state government.
In order to position Garrett doctrinally, I first describe the conceptual
framework that determines the validity of Congress' effort to abrogate state
judicial sovereignty. This is an abridged version since more complete histo-
ries have been reported widely, both recently in these pages,16 and in many
other journals.' 7 I then turn to Garrett's holding and the Court's reasoning in
ERALISM: REAL OR IMAGINED, THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 137 (Frank Goodman ed., 2001).
10. That majority is composed of Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justices
Anthony Kennedy, Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas.
11. See discussion and authorities cited supra notes 4 - 5, 8.
12. Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
13. Justice O'Connor has called this "the oldest question of constitutional law." New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992). Her observation inspired the title of Pro-
fessor H. Jefferson Powell's classic federalism article, The Oldest Question of Constitutional
Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633 (1993). Recently, Professor Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, has
perpetuated this play on the words. See Ana Maria Merico-Stephens, Of Maine's Sover-
eignty, Alden's Federalism, and the Myth of Absolute Principles: the Newest Oldest Ques-
tion of Constitutional Law, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 325, 327 (2000).
14. See Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Notes on a National Neuroses,
41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 950 (1994).
15. See, e.g., Merico-Stephens, supra note 13, at 327 (describing federalism as a "mys-
tical world [accentuated by] an abstruse and bewildering labyrinth of categorical principles
discernible only to five spellbound members of our current Supreme Court."). Robert
Nagel has even argued that "it is not too much to say that the principle of federalism is so
conflicted and ambiguous that it cannot be enforced in any sustained and coherent way."
Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Power and the Restoration of Federalism, in THE SUPREME
COURT'S FEDERALISM: REAL OR IMAGINED, THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 52, 55 (Frank Goodman ed., 2001) (emphasis in the
original).
16. See Ana Marie Merico-Stephens, United States v. Morrison and the Emperor's
New Clothes, 27 J.C. & U.L. 735 (2001); Timothy S. McFadden, The New Age of the Elev-
enth Amendment: A Survey of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence
and a Review of Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 27 J.C. & U.L. 519 (2000).
17. See Roger C. Hartley, The Alden Trilogy: Praise and Protest, 23 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 323, 328-336 (2000) (citing authority); Roger C. Hartley, The New Federalism
and the ADA: State Sovereign Immunity From Private Damage Suits After Boerne, N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 481, 486-96 (1998) (citing authority).
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Garrett to demonstrate that Garrett raised the bar making it more problem-
atic than ever that Congress will be able to deploy Section 5 to abrogate state
judicial immunity. I shall argue that the outcome in Garrett was dictated
neither by precedent nor by the rational basis standard of judicial review
accorded disability-based discrimination.' 8 After evaluating the Court's deci-
sion in Garrett, I evaluate some options for enforcing federal rights that have
survived Garrett.19 I finish with a discussion of some likely repercussions we
might expect from Garrett.
20
II. PREREQUISITES FOR VALID EXERCISE OF THE SECTION 5 POWER:
BACKGROUND AND BASICS
The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. 21 By its terms, the
Eleventh Amendment would suggest the following conclusions about its
scope - all of which are incorrect under Supreme Court precedent:
* That state judicial immunity is limited to suits in federal court. In Al-
den v. Maine,22 the Court held that the Constitution provides the
States immunity from suit in their own courts without their consent.
The text of the Eleventh Amendment is no impediment to this con-
clusion because, in the Court's view, the concept of Eleventh Amend-
ment sovereign immunity is "something of a misnomer" since
"sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from nor is limited
by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. '2 3 It derives instead from
the history and structure of the Constitution.
" That judicial immunity is limited to suits brought by a citizen of an-
other state - either in a diversity action brought in federal court when
a state is a defendant or, perhaps, also to federal question suits brought
in federal court against a state by a diverse plaintiff. In fact, for over
one-hundred years, state judicial immunity has been interpreted also
to extend to cases in federal court against a state brought by one of
its own citizens asserting a federal right.
24
18. See discussion infra notes 83-97 and accompanying text.
19. See discussion infra notes 98-229 and accompanying text.
20. See discussion infra notes 230-308 and accompanying text.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment reversed Chisolm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. 419 (1793) (upholding the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to hear a diversity
action brought on a state claim).
22. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
23. Id. at 713. The Court interprets the Eleventh Amendment "to stand not so much
for what it says, but for the presupposition.. . which it confirms." Blatchford v. Native Viii.
of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).
24. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000) ("[Our cases have
extended [state judicial sovereignty] to suits by citizens against their own states."). Accord
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
[Vol. 28, No. 1
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AFTER GARRETT
" That judicial immunity is limited to suits brought either by a citizen of
the United States or a citizen or subject of a foreign state. In fact, the
States also are protected from unconsented suits brought by foreign
states 25 or brought by an Indian Tribe.
26
" That judicial immunity is limited to suits brought in law or equity. In
fact, state judicial sovereignty also extends to admiralty suits.
27
State judicial sovereignty does not extend to several important categories
of litigation, however. First, it does not bar a suit against a state brought in
Federal court by another state.28 It does not bar suits brought by the United
States.29 It does not bar private actions against a state that are brought in the
state court of another state on a state law cause of action.30 And, it does not
extend to certain federal court suits against state officers.
31
State judicial immunity is qualified in two additional important ways.
First, it can be relinquished through waiver manifested by "express language"
or by "overwhelming implication. '32 Moreover, Congress possesses author-
ity to abrogate state judicial immunity "when it both unequivocally intends to
do so and act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority. '33 Prior
to the 1996 Supreme Court decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
3 4
Congress possessed two such "valid grant[s] of constitutional authority."
Congress could rely on the Commerce Power
35 or on the Section 5 power.36
Seminole Tribe expressly rejected the Commerce Clause as a source of abro-
gation authority, and that decision is now cited for the broader proposition
that "Congress may not .. .base its abrogation of the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity upon the power enumerated in Article I."'37 Seminole
Tribe thus left only the Section 5 power as a source of abrogation authority.
25. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 31 (1934).
26. See Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 775.
27. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
28. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
29. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143
U.S. 621 (1892).
30. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
31. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (discussing damages actions brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against state officers sued in their individual capacity) (See
discussion infra notes 181-99 and accompanying text); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)
(discussing actions for prospective relief against state officers sued in their official capacity)
(See discussion infra notes 200-29 and accompanying text).
32. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974).
33. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 962.
34. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) [hereinafter Seminole Tribe].
35. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989) (plurality opinion).
36. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976).
37. Cf. Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 262 B.R. 412 (6th
Cir. BAP 2001) (Bankruptcy Appellate Panel) (holding that States cannot invoke their
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy discharge proceedings because the States ceded their
sovereign immunity to the national government by virtue of the authority granted Con-
gress in Article I to establish "uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States.").
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Seminole Tribe made the scope of the Section 5 power the critical question
in abrogation cases. Accordingly, the Court's 1997 decision in City of Boerne
v. Flores38 became pivotal since it was the first case after Seminole Tribe to
explain when Congress' exercise of its Section 5 power is valid. Boerne held
that Congress lacks authority to apply to the States the provisions of the Re-
ligious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA). 39 In Boerne, the Court
acknowledged an important principle that it has repeated in every Section 5
case since Boerne: Congress' Section 5 power to "enforce" the provisions of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
is not limited to mere legislative repetition of this Court's constitutional
jurisprudence. 'Rather, Congress' power 'to enforce' the amendment
includes the authority both to remedy and to deter violation of rights
guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of
conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the amend-
ment's text.'
40
That is to say, Congress may legislate "even if in the process it prohibits con-
duct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres
of authority previously reserved to the states.' ,,41 It was necessary that the
Court in Boerne acknowledge Congress' authority to add overbreadth to its
Section 5 legislation because otherwise the Court would have had to overrule
every Section 5 case the Court had ever decided. The reason is that Section-
5-based legislation always contains overbreadth: Congress has never legis-
lated under Section 5 just to proscribe legislatively only what the Fourteenth
Amendment already prohibits.
42
However, the Court in Boerne expressed great distress over this over-
breadth principle.43 Its apprehension was that permitting Congress to ban
through the Section 5 power more conduct than Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment proscribes might result in Congress, rather than the Court, "de-
cree[ing] the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the
38. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
39. 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et seq. (1994).
40. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963 (quoting Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81
(2000) (emphasis added)).
41. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
42. See Michael Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and A Court With An Eccentric
Mission, 62 OHIo ST. L.J. 31, 47-67 (2001) (reviewing all of the Court's Section 5 cases
prior to Garrett).
43. Using the phrase "overbreadth" to describe federal Section 5 legislation that pro-
hibits both unconstitutional behavior and behavior that is not prohibited by the Constitu-
tion should not, of course, be confused with the doctrine of First Amendment overbreadth,
which relates to the unconstitutionality of legislation that regulates substantially more
speech than the First Amendment permits. The latter is a standing doctrine. See, e.g.,
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615-16 (1973) (holding that for one whose own con-
duct is not constitutionally protected to have standing to challenge the facial unconstitu-
tionality of legislation regulating speech, one must demonstrate overbreadth that is both
real and substantial).
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States." 44 To avoid this risk when Congress adds overbreadth to its Section-
5-based legislation, the Court in Boerne adopted the restraining principle that
overbroad legislation "must exhibit 'congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that
end."' 45 In Boerne, and in each of the five post-Boerne Section 5 cases, the
Court declared unconstitutional Congress' effort to abrogate state sovereign
immunity because the statute at issue failed this congruence and proportion-
ality test. These cases have clarified, somewhat, how properly to analyze
"congruence and proportionality" but they also leave considerable
uncertainty.
It now is clear that, at a minimum, Section 5-based legislation is not "con-
gruent" with the prohibitions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
unless the aim of the Section 5 legislation is the elimination of conduct the
Supreme Court is prepared to conclude is unconstitutional. The federal Dis-
trict Court for the Middle District of Alabama put it this way:
The teaching of Boerne is that there must be a substantial constitutional
hook: The principal object of the legislation must be to address rights
that are judicially recognized; Congress can prohibit conduct that is not
unconstitutional, but such legislation must be nothing more than inci-
dental to a primary effort of prohibiting conduct that is unconstitu-
tional. . . . [T]he prohibited constitutional conduct must be, at most,
always a bridesmaid and never the bride; the bride must always be the
unconstitutional conduct.
46
RFRA, the federal statute at issue in Boerne, may have been the poster
child of a federal statute whose aim was something other than prohibiting
conduct the Supreme Court considered unconstitutional. This at least
seemed to be the Court's view when it held that "RFRA cannot be consid-
ered remedial, preventative legislation if those terms are to have any mean-
ing. ''47 RFRA provided that laws that "substantially burden" the exercise of
religion are unlawful unless they advance a "compelling governmental inter-
est" and are "the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest. '48 RFRA thus created rights greater than those the
Constitution provides because laws that burden religious expression can be
challenged on Free Exercise grounds only if they are targeted at religious
44. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. The Court emphasized that "[l]egislation which alters the
meaning of the [a constitutional Clause] cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause." Id.
"Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been
given the power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation." Id. Congress' power is "corrective or preventive, not definitional." Id. at 525.
45. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963 (citing Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520).
46. Supp. 2d 1092, 1108 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
47. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532 ("RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial
or preventative object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to pre-
vent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears instead to attempt a substantive change in
constitutional protections.").
48. 42 U.S.C. §2000bb 1(a), (b).
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practices.4 9 The legislative process in RFRA failed to demonstrate any con-
temporary evidence of state-sponsored targeting of religious practices in
American society. 50 Thus, the Court concluded, RFRA's aim could not have
been the eradication of a pattern of unconstitutional religious persecution.
Accordingly, the provision in RFRA abrogating state sovereign immunity
was not a valid exercise of the Section 5 power.
The next two Section 5 cases arose from a 1994 lawsuit that the College
Savings Bank brought against the Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, an entity the parties agreed was an arm of the state of Flor-
ida.5 1 In College Savings Bank I, plaintiffs had alleged patent infringement.
5 2
The Supreme Court agreed that patents are property protected from depriva-
tion by a state without due process of law. 53 But, the Court found, Congress
did not enact the patent laws to target state deprivation of patents without
due process of law. Rather, "Congress appears to have enacted this legisla-
tion in response to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that do
not necessarily violate the Constitution.
' '54
49. Congress enacted RFRA to reverse a 1990 Supreme Court decision, Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, members of the Native American Church
presented the claim that a state law barring the use of peyote violated their religious free-
dom since for them peyote was a sacrament. Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause of
the First Amendment does not provide protection from the incidental burdens on religious
expression that may result from the nondiscriminatory application of facially neutral laws
of general application. After Smith, laws that burden religious expression can be chal-
lenged on Free Exercise grounds only if targeted at religious practices.
50. To the contrary, the Court found that "[t]he history of [religious] persecution in
this country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years."
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530. This "absence of more recent episodes," RFRA's proponents
testified, is explained by the fact that "'deliberate persecution is not the usual problem in
this country"' and "'[laws targeting religious practices have become increasingly rare."'
Id.
51. See College Savings Bank 1, 527 U.S. at 633 n.3.
52. The College Savings Bank alleged a violation of 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (1994).
53. See College Savings Bank 1, 527 U.S. at 642 ("Patents ... have long been consid-
ered a species of property."). In its companion case, College Savings Bank II, the Court
never addressed the Section 5 analysis required by Boerne. That suit alleged state violation
of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act). In College Savings Bank 11, the Court re-
jected that Congress enacted the false advertising provisions of the Lanham Act to enforce
the requirements of Due Process because it rejected that the right not to be victimized by
false advertising is a property right. 527 U.S. at 673. Nor is the act of engaging in business,
the interest that false advertising impinges, a species of property. Id. at 675.
54. College Savings Bank 1, 527 U.S. at 645-46. The Court drew this conclusion from
an examination of the legislative record, which revealed no evidence of a pattern of patent
infringement by state governments, undermining the "proposition that Congress sought to
remedy a Fourteenth Amendment violation in enacting the [patent laws]." Id. at 642. In
addition, "Congress ... barely considered the availability of state remedies for patent in-
fringement ... ." Id. at 643. Since the due process violation arises "only where the State
provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringe-
ment of their patent[,]" this failure by Congress to examine state remedies undercuts the
assertion that the aim of the patent laws was to eradicate deprivation of patent rights with-
out due process of law. Id. at 643.
[Vol. 28, No. 1
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AFTER GARRETT
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regent 5 5 was next. Kimel invalidated the provi-
sions of the ADEA that authorize private damage remedies against the state
in federal court. In EEOC v. Wyoming,5 6 the Court had held that the ADEA
was enacted pursuant to a valid exercise of the Commerce Power. Kimel
reaffirmed that conclusion.57 The issue in Kimel was remedy: the validity of
ADEA's abrogation of state sovereign immunity to provide for a private suit
for damages against the States in federal court. By the time Kimel reached
the Court, it was clear that such a remedy is valid only if the Congress un-
equivocally manifests an intent to exercise its Section 5 power and if the exer-
cise was valid in the circumstances. 5 8 The Court in Kimel held that Congress
had made a clear statement of its intent to deploy its Section 5 power but
concluded that the deployment was invalid.
5 9
Kimel is useful analytically because it clarifies the importance of isolating
the Fourteenth Amendment right that Section 5 legislation purports to en-
force. Until this is done, one cannot determine if the legislation contains
overbreadth - creates rights that exceed those provided in Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. If the legislation contains overbreadth, Congress
possesses Section 5 authority to enact it only if the principal aim of the legis-
lation is to deter or remedy unconstitutional conduct.
The Fourteenth Amendment right implicated by the ADEA is age dis-
crimination. In three previous cases, the Court had held that the age classifi-
cations are presumptively constitutional and will be upheld if rationally
related to a legitimate governmental interest. 60 Accordingly, the Constitu-
tion permits a state to make generalizations about age and use age as a proxy
for other qualities, abilities, or characteristics that are relevant to a state's
legitimate interests. None of this is irrational.61 But because the ADEA pro-
hibits such generalizations, 62 it prohibits conduct that is constitutional. The
ADEA thus contains substantial overbreadth.
Since the Court found that the ADEA contains a significant amount of
overbreadth, it next inquired into whether the principal purpose of the
ADEA was to deter or remedy unconstitutional age discrimination. The
Court found this was not ADEA's aim. That conclusion was grounded on
the Court's finding that the ADEA's extension to the States was "an unwar-
ranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem. ' 63 The evidence in
the legislative record to the contrary was "short of the mark. ' '64 Since the
55. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
56. 460 U.S. 226, 243 (1983).
57. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78.
58. See discussion supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
59. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73-74.
60. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93
(1979); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
61. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83-85.
62. See id. at 87.
63. Id. at 89.
64. Id. The Court concluded: Congress made no legislative findings of unconstitu-
tional age discrimination by the states. Id. at 90. Moreover, that record "reveals that Con-
gress had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments were
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aim of the ADEA was other than to deter or remedy unconstitutional age
discrimination, the statute failed to satisfy Boerne's congruence and propor-
tionality test. Thus, Congress lacked Section 5 power to enact the over-
breadth in the ADEA.
United States v. Morrison65 was decided only a few months after Kimel and
was the last Section 5 decision by the Court prior to Garrett.66 Even if one
were to conclude that Boerne, College Savings Bank I, and Kimel are un-
remarkable because in each the record was barren of evidence that the aim of
the statute was to deter or remedy unconstitutional conduct, Morrison was
different.
The 1994 Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) created a new civil right.
It provided victims of gender-motivated crimes a federal private right of ac-
tion to sue perpetrators for damages in federal court. Thirty-eight states sup-
ported VAWA when the bill was before the Congress and thirty-six states
joined an amicus brief in support of VAWA when Morrison was heard by the
Court.67 Unlike the previous Section 5 cases, the legislative record in Morri-
son was replete with examples of unconstitutional behavior - a conspicuous
pattern of under-enforcement of state criminal law intended to protect wo-
men from domestic violence. 68 VAWA was aimed at remedying (and perhaps
deterring) this failure of law enforcement. VAWA's strategy was to remedy
the States' discriminatory response to gender-motivated crimes by conferring
on the victims of gender-based violence a federal self-help tort claim against
perpetrators of that violence. In addition, in light of the publicity these suits
would generate, state officials might begin to enforce state law in a more
gender-neutral manner.
The Court challenged neither the adequacy of Congress' demonstration of
a pattern of unconstitutionality nor the efficacy of VAWA's strategy for de-
terring and remedying it. VAWA was declared unconstitutional, neverthe-
less, to the extent that it "is directed not at any State or state actor, but at
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age." Id. at 91.
"Congress never identified any pattern of discrimination by the States, much less any dis-
crimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional violation." Id. at 89. Uncon-
stitutional age discrimination was not "a problem of national import." Id. at 90.
65. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
66. Before reaching the Section 5 issue, the Court first held that Congress lacked
authority under the Commerce Clause to enact VAWA. See discussion supra note 5.
67. See Herman Schwartz, The Supreme Court's Federalism: Fig Leaf for Conserva-
tives, in THE SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM: REAL OR IMAGINED, THE ANNALS OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 119, 124-25 (Frank Goodman
ed., 2001).
68. The Court acknowledged:
[the] voluminous.., record [documenting] that many participants in state justice
systems are perpetuating an array of erroneous stereotypes and assumptions
[that] often result in insufficient investigation and prosecution of gender-moti-
vated crime, inappropriate focus on the behavior and credibility of the victims of
that crime, and unacceptably lenient punishments for those who are actually con-
victed of gender-motivated violence.
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620.
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individuals who have committed criminal acts motivated by gender bias. '69
Citing the Civil Rights Cases decided over a century ago,70 the Court ruled
that Section 5 empowers Congress to regulate conduct of state officials but
not private conduct. 71 Then, possibly adding an additional hurdle for Con-
gress, the Court noted that in any event VAWA is applicable nationwide but
"Congress' findings indicate that the problem of discrimination against the
victims of gender-motivated crimes does not exist in all states, or even most
States.'72 The Court's observation seems to suggest that Congress may lack
Section 5 authority to enact legislation having nationwide applicability if
Congress fails to establish that the unconstitutional conduct it seeks to re-
dress or remedy occurs nationwide. 7
3
In sum, Boerne, College Savings Bank I, Kimel, and Morrison together
establish the following principles to guide one in determining whether legisla-
tion is a valid exercise of the Section 5 power to "enforce" the provisions of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
74
* In addition to proscribing unconstitutional conduct, Congress' power
"to enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment includes the authority both
to remedy or to deter the violation of rights guaranteed thereunder
by prohibiting conduct that is not itself forbidden by Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
" When Section 5 legislation prohibits conduct that is not itself forbid-
den by the Fourteenth Amendment's text (and this can only be ascer-
tained by a clear understanding of the Amendment's substantive
reach in varying contexts), the legislation must exhibit "congruence
and proportionality" to the constitutional violation to be deterred or
remedied.
" This requires, at a minimum, that the principal object of the legisla-
tion, its aim, must be deterring or remedying conduct the judiciary
would find is prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.
* Satisfaction of this "principal object" test requires, at a minimum, a
demonstration that, at the time of the enactment, Congress was
aware of a contemporaneous pattern of unconstitutional conduct of
the type that the legislation is said to be either deterring or remedy-
69. Id. at 626.
70. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
71. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 621-22.
72. Id. at 626.
73. But see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (upholding provisions of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965 having nationwide application although the evil addressed was
not present nationwide; see also Robert C. Post & Reya B. Siegel, Equal Protection Law:
Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 478-
80 (2000) (advancing the argument that nationwide application is preferable because: 1) it
lessens risk that federal law will be perceived as discriminating against certain states or
certain parts of the country; 2) it facilitates interstate travel by reducing the concern that
travel to another state will cause a loss of federally protected rights; 3) it will avoid the
necessity of line drawing, which may be problematic in close cases; and 4) it communicates
the nationwide importance of addressing the problem.).
74. See discussion supra notes 45, 53-54, 63, 71-72 and accompanying text.
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ing (a conclusion that also requires a clear understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment's reach). The primary, though not exclusive,
source of this demonstration of primary purpose will be congres-
sional findings and the legislative facts developed in the legislative
history.75
" If Congress' aim in a given statute is found to be eradication of un-
constitutional state action, the means chosen must not be dispropor-
tionate to that end.
" Federal law that is designed to deter or remedy unconstitutional con-
duct may not do so by regulating private conduct.
" And perhaps, Congress may not attempt to deter or remedy uncon-
stitutional conduct by making federal law applicable nationwide
when Congress has failed to show that the unconstitutional condition
being deterred or remedied exists in most states.
This then is the legal landscape in which the parties litigated the Garrett
case. I show next how the ADA could have been interpreted to satisfy these
prerequisites if the Court properly understood, and had been willing to en-
dorse, Congress' strategy in the ADA for eradicating disability-based dis-
crimination. I also show that the Court in Garrett placed several new limits
on Congress' exercise of the Section 5 power. These new restrictions nulli-
fied Congress' ADA strategy and created new hurdles the ADA could not
surmount.
III. THE COURT'S REASONING IN GARRETT AND ITS FAILURE TO
ADDRESS THE "REAL" ADA
The ADA was the best litigation vehicle among the Court's recent Section
5 cases to establish the validity of Congress' exercise of its Section 5 power.
Like VAWA, and unlike the other Section 5 cases, the ADA's legislative re-
cord makes an overwhelming case demonstrating a pattern of invidious dis-
crimination. This pattern consists of societal discrimination against persons
with disabilities generally and a pattern of unconstitutional state and local
disability-based discrimination in particular. 76 And, unlike the VAWA dis-
pute in Morrison, the Section 5 issue in Garrett arose in litigation against a
state, so there was no distraction of Congress using Section 5 to regulate
private conduct.
Nevertheless, the customary five-member majority of the Court held that
the ADA foundered initially on the now familiar obstacle that "in order to
authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the States,
there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the
75. On the centrality of legislative findings see Cherry v. University of Wisconsin Sys-
tem Board of Regents, 265 F.3d 541, 553 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that while the legislative
record is an "important factor,"' "the lack of legislative support in the record is not deter-
minative of the [S]ec. 5 inquiry."' (citing Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91).
76. See discussion infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text.
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Fourteenth Amendment .... ,,77 First, examining the legislative facts Con-
gress assembled, the Court held they "simply fail[ ] to show that Congress did
in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment
against the disabled." Respondents' brief, the majority found, contained
only a "half a dozen examples [of unconstitutional employment discrimina-
tion] from the [legislative] record that ... involve States. '78 "[E]ven if it
were to be determined that each incident upon fuller examination showed
unconstitutional action on the part of the State, these incidents taken to-
gether fall far short of even suggesting a pattern of unconstitutional discrimi-
nation on which § 5 legislation must be based.
'79
Turning next to Congress' findings in the ADA, the Court conceded that
Congress made findings of "pervasive," societal discrimination against the
disabled, but the Court found fault in Congress' failure to include any find-
ings that the States had engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional disability-
based employment discrimination.8 0 To the contrary, the Court noted that
the principal Senate and House committees made findings of disability-based
employment discrimination only with respect to "employment in the private
sector."' The majority drew from this the negative implication that "Con-
gress' failure to mention States in its legislative findings addressing discrimi-
nation in employment reflects that body's judgment that no pattern of
unconstitutional state action [in employment] had been documented."8 2
The Court's decision in Garrett thus rests primarily on Congress' failure to
identify the requisite "pattern" of unconstitutionality when enacting the
ADA.83 More particularly, the decision rests squarely on the assumption that
77. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967-68. Earlier in the opinion, the Court established that the
ADA prohibits more than what the Constitution prohibits. An example is the ADA's re-
quirement that employers make a reasonable accommodation to otherwise qualified indi-
•viduals with a disability. The Court counters that "States are not required by the
Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their
actions towards such individuals are rational. They could quite hard-headedly - and.per-
haps hardheartedly - hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance
for the disabled." Id. at 964. Accord id. at 967. By further example, the Court later
pointed out that the ADA's prohibitions on using job criteria that have a disparate impact
on persons with disabilities exceeds the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment. See dis-
cussion id. at 967.
78. Id. at 965. The Court dismissed the States' active participation in the eugenics
movement, noting first that the Court had upheld these laws in Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200
(1927) and, in any event, "there is no indication that any State had persisted in requiring
such harsh measures as of 1990 when the ADA was adopted." Id. at n.6.
79. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965. In addition, the majority reasoned, "[it is telling ...
that given the[ ] large numbers [of public employees employed by state governments],
Congress assembled only such minimal evidence of unconstitutional state discrimination in
employment against the disabled." Id. at 965-966.
80. See id. at 966.
81. Id. (emphasis in the original).
82. Id.
83. The Court added that even if somehow it were possible to "squeeze out of these
examples of unconstitutional [disability-based employment] discrimination by the
States[,]" the ADA's overbreadth is too excessive for it to be considered a congruent and
proportionate response. Id. at 966. The Court cited the ADA's provisions for reasonable
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the "pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must
be based '8 4 for ADA Title I to be constitutional is a pattern of State employ-
ment discrimination, and no other pattern of unconstitutional behavior may
be considered. Two momentous policy decisions are built into this
conclusion.
First, by defining "pattern" as a pattern of state discrimination in employ-
ment, the Court refused to consider any evidence of unconstitutional behav-
ior by units of local government (cities and counties) when measuring
whether Congress established the required pattern of unconstitutionality.
8 5
This appears to represent a change from the Court's approach in Kimel, de-
cided just about a year before Garrett.
s6
Second, by defining "pattern" as a pattern of state discrimination in em-
ployment, the Court refused to consider any evidence of unconstitutional
state behavior other than employment discrimination. Justice Breyer, writing
for the dissent, appended a 16-page appendix to his dissenting opinion. It
lists approximately 300 examples from the ADA's legislative history docu-
menting discriminatory actions by state and local governments against the
disabled.8 7 In response, the majority stated that:
only a fraction ['somewhere around 50'] relates to state discrimination
against the disabled in employment. ... The overwhelming majority of
these accounts [of discrimination against the disabled ] pertain to al-
leged discrimination [other than employment discrimination] by the
States in the provision of public services and public accommodations,
which areas are addressed in Titles 11 and III of the ADA.88
accommodation and prohibitions against work rules that have a disparate impact on per-
sons with disabilities.
84. Id. at 965.
85. "It would make no sense to consider constitutional violations on their part, as well
as by the States themselves, when only the States are the beneficiaries of the Eleventh
Amendment." Id. at 965.
86. In Kimel, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, stated that Congress had
failed to find a pattern of unconstitutional age discrimination by the States. See Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) ("Congress never identified any pattern of
age discrimination by the States, much less any discrimination whatsoever that rose to the
level of constitutional violation."); Id. at 90-91 ("Congress failed to identify a widespread
pattern of age discrimination by the States."). But Justice O'Connor seems to define the
"States" in this context as both the States and their political subdivisions, for the Kimel
opinion concludes that "[a] review of the ADEA's legislative record as a whole, then,
reveals that Congress had virtually no reason to believe that state and local governments
were unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis of age." Id. at
91 (emphasis added).
87. Id. at 977-993 (Breyer J., dissenting).
88. In addition, the Court refused to consider any evidence of societal discrimination
when considering whether Congress established the required pattern of unconstitutional-
ity. Relying on negative implications from the congressional findings contained in the
ADA, the Court refused to consider the possibility of an inference that state government
likewise participated in the "pervasive" discriminatory conduct Congress uncovered. (See
discussion supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.).
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It is useful to keep in mind, therefore, that Garrett contains no holding
that Congress failed to identify a pattern of unconstitutional conduct directed
against persons with disabilities. The Court rather held that there was an
absence of a particular kind of pattern of unconstitutionality, namely, the
absence of a pattern of state disability-based employment discrimination. The
soundness of the Garrett decision thus rests on whether so constricting the
definition of "pattern" is warranted. In other words, is it defensible to make
the ADA's constitutionality depend on the presence or absence of a pattern
of state unconstitutional employment discrimination and refuse to consider
any other pattern of unconstitutionality? This is a critical question because
the case for the constitutionality of Title I is strengthened significantly by
redefining slightly the definition of "pattern of unconstitutionality." This is
easily demonstrated.
The ADA has been characterized as a "second-generation" civil rights
statute.89 Typically, civil rights statutes attempt to deter and remedy invidi-
ous discrimination by proscribing it. The ADA also proscribes invidious dis-
crimination.90 In addition, as a means of deterring and remedying invidious
discrimination, the ADA also requires covered entities to take affirmative
steps to integrate persons with disabilities into the mainstream of American
social and economic life.91
Congress' strategy in the ADA is built upon two findings, each of which
Congress self-consciously adopted and supported factually in the legislative
record. First, Congress found a "pervasive" pattern of invidious discrimina-
tion, directed against persons with disabilities, engaged in by both state and
local government. 92 The invidious discrimination by state and local govern-
ment permeates not only employment but also delivery of a wide array of
government services and public accommodations. 93 It is systemic. The Gar-
rett majority never disputes, nor could it, that Congress did make adequate
findings of such a pattern of unconstitutional state and local system-wide dis-
89. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans With Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413
(1991).
90. See discussion infra notes 141-78 and accompanying text.
91. See Burgdorf, supra note 89, at 460-62 (discussing the ADA requirement to make
reasonable accommodations that do not create an undue hardship).
92. In the ADA statement of findings, Congress concluded: 1) that "historically, soci-
ety has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities [a problem that] con-
tinue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social problem." 42 U.S.C. §12101(a)(2). This
"discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as employ-
ment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication... insti-
tutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services." ADA §12101(a)(3).
The discrimination suffered by persons with disabilities includes "a history of purposeful
unequal treatment[,]" ADA §12101(a)(7), as well as "outright intentional exclusion, . ..
segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, and other
opportunities." ADA §12101(a)(5). Accordingly, Congress enacted the ADA to "provide
a.. . national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disa-
bilities." ADA §12101(b)(1).
93. See authority cited id.
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crimination (a conclusion the Breyer opinion's appendix certainly
demonstrates).
The second finding upon which the ADA is built relates to the question of
how best to deter and remedy this "pervasive" pattern of systemic unconsti-
tutional discrimination, which includes a pattern of unconstitutional disabil-
ity-based discrimination by state and local government. Congress' choice was
to integrate persons with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream
of American life and thereby deter future unconstitutional discrimination by
attacking its cause - the prejudice arising from isolation of the disabled.
94
The legislative record demonstrates that Congress self-consciously adopted
the view that usually the most disabling part of being disabled is the negative
reaction of others.95 The academic literature overwhelmingly supports the
conclusion upon which the ADA is built - that the most efficacious way to
remedy the prejudice of others against persons with disabilities is to integrate
disabled persons into the mainstream of economic and social life,96 This at-
tacks a systemic problem systemically. The strategy's efficacy requires that
federal legislation attack each component of the overall pattern of invidious
discrimination including state and local governments' employment discrimi-
nation and discrimination in delivery of public services. Congress concluded
that only by prohibiting all invidious discrimination directed against persons
with disabilities, and only by requiring as complete an integration as possible
of persons with disabilities, could the war on prejudice be won.
This vision of the ADA as a second generation civil rights statute never
made an appearance in the Garrett majority opinion. Indeed, if one were to
read just the Garrett majority opinion one would have no understanding that
the statute found unconstitutional in Garrett was designed to eradicate the
94. I have detailed this strategy elsewhere. See Hartley, The New Federalism, supra
note 17, at 524-28. Respondents in Garrett brought this strategy to the Court's attention.
See Brief for Respondent at 47-48, Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 2000 WL
1593420 (Aug. 11, 2000) (No. 99-1240).
95. See Hartley, supra note 17, at 524-25 (quoting the legislative ADA history and
particularly the official position of the first Bush administration expressed by its represent-
atives' testimony before Congress showing that the consensus was that the most efficacious
way to attack invidious disability-based discrimination is to reshape attitudes of the non-
disabled community through the process of integration of the disabled community into the
mainstream of society.). See also Brief for Respondent at 47-48, Bd. of Trustees of the
Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 2000 WL 1593420 (Aug. 11, 2000) (No. 99-1240) (citing extensive
evidence from the legislative record demonstrating that Congress' conviction that as:
employers became exposed to persons with disabilities through compliance with
the ADA, they would be educated out of the stereotypes, prejudices, and discom-
fort that had become entrenched due to the absence of such persons in the work-
place [with the result that] [o]ver time . . .employers would hire persons with
disabilities because they recognized their capabilities and were not discomforted,
and not simply to avoid violating the ADA."
Id.
96. See discussion Hartley, supra note 17, at 525-28 (demonstrating that integration
erodes prejudice in diverse and psychologically complex ways and also works by helping
persons with disabilities form bonds with non-disabled persons that assist persons with
disabilities to learn to conform to the cultural norms of the non-disabled community).
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pattern of unconstitutional disability-based discrimination Congress docu-
mented by integrating the disabled into American economic, social, and po-
litical life. The Court states that the only conclusion one can draw from
Congress' failure to make a specific legislative finding of a pattern of state
disability-based employment discrimination is that Congress found no such
pattern and if there were no such pattern then providing private Title I dam-
age actions against the States is unconstitutional. By so framing the analysis,
the Court avoids addressing the central question that requires resolution:
even if there were no pattern of state employment discrimination, does Sec-
tion 5 nevertheless authorize Congress to enlist the States in the effort to
remedy the pattern of unconstitutional conduct Congress did document - an
overall pattern of unconstitutional behavior by state and local government
across a wide spectrum of activities - when the only way to deter and rem-
edy this pattern of unconstitutional conduct is to integrate the disabled into
State employment?
97
In other words, Garrett leaves unanswered the most interesting and impor-
tant issue the case presented: Why is Congress without authority to abrogate
state judicial immunity regarding employment policies that harm persons
with disabilities 1) when there are legislative facts showing a pervasive pat-
tern of unconstitutional disability-based discrimination (if one includes the
totality of state and local governments' behavior) and 2) when Congress con-
cludes, based on those facts, that integration of the disabled into society is
the key to deterring and remedying the prejudice causing this pervasive pat-
tern of unconstitutional discrimination, and 3) when the only efficacious way
to integrate the disabled into society is to integrate them into all segments of
society, including all aspects of public sector employment?
This is the central question that Title I's abrogation provisions pose and it
is. unfortunate that Garrett avoids it. If there is no principled basis to deny
Congress' Section 5 power to abrogate state judicial immunity when the legis-
lative record supports each of the three conditions stated above - and one is
97. When the question is posed this way, eliminating local government from the calcu-
lation of pattern makes little sense. First, the pattern-of-unconstitutionality requirement
found in the Court's recent Section 5 cases exists to provide comfort to the Court that
Congress is not attempting "to rewrite the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by this
Court .... Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 968. Local government need not be eliminated from the
pattern calculation for pattern to serve this separation-of-powers function since both state
and local governments are regulated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, when the
issue is whether the Congress may enlist the States to redress a pattern of unconstitutional-
ity created through the combined acts of both state and local governments, it begs the issue
to deny Congress Section 5 power by insisting that the pattern not include unconstitutional
behavior by local government.
Similarly, the Garrett opinion also engages in question-begging when the Court de-
mands that only unconstitutional employment discrimination, and no other, be considered
in calculating pattern. For the requisite pattern of unconstitutionality needs to include all
unconstitutional disability-based discrimination when the question is not whether Congress
had power to eradicate a pattern of employment discrimination, but whether Congress
may regulate the States' employment practices as a means of integrating persons with disa-
bilities in order to deter and remedy the pattern of system-wide disability-based unconsti-
tutional discrimination that Congress did uncover.
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at a loss to imagine what that basis might be - then Garrett was decided
incorrectly. If, notwithstanding the pattern of unconstitutionality that Con-
gress did document and notwithstanding the need to integrate the disabled
that Congress did demonstrate, there still is no Section 5 power, one would
think that we deserve to know why. Garrett provides not a clue.
IV. OPTIONS STILL AVAILABLE AFTER GARRETT TO REDRESS
DISABILITY-BASED DISCRIMINATION
Garrett addressed remedy: When may Congress authorize individuals to
recover money damages against the States? That issue ought not be confused
with the question of whether Title I of the ADA imposes enforceable limita-
tions on the States. As to that question the Court's answer in Garrett is an
emphatic yes.98 Accordingly, Title I's requirements "can be enforced by the
United States in actions for money damages . . . . 99 States also may waive
98. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 968 n.9 ("Title I of the ADA still prescribes standards
applicable to the States."). In concurrence, Justice Kennedy commented:
It must be noted.., that what is in question is not whether the Congress, acting
pursuant to a power granted to it by the Constitution, can compel the States to
act. What is involved is only the question whether the States can be subjected to
liability in suits brought not by the Federal Government (to which the States
have consented ... ), but by private persons seeking to collect moneys from the
state treasury without the consent of the State.
Id. at 969.
99. Id. I have argued elsewhere that the government enforcement model for enforc-
ing federal rights may indeed be "whimsy" as alleged by the dissenters in Alden v. Maine.
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 810 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). The defect in the
model resides in the lack of federal resources and the absence of political will. See Hartley,
The Alden Trilogy, supra note 17, at 373-76. See also Civil Rights Commission Report
Deplores Inadequate Funding, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 35 (March 15, 2001) (sum-
marizing a report issued by the United States Civil Rights Commission concluding that
funding and staffing levels for civil rights enforcement remain inadequate, detrimentally
affecting those agencies' ability to fulfill their missions); Funding For Civil Rights De-
creased in Recent Years, 36 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 130 (Oct. 26, 2000) (reporting
conclusions of the United States Civil Rights Commission that the six major federal civil
rights enforcement agencies have suffered a steady drop in funding and staffing over the
past five years); NCD Report Faults Federal Agencies' Enforcement Activities Under ADA,
18 DISABILITY COMP. BULL. (LRP) 5 (Aug. 10, 2000) (reporting the findings of the cabinet-
level independent federal agency, The National Council on Disabilities, in its report,
Promises to Keep: A Decade of Federal Enforcement of the Americans With Disabilities Act
that the ADA's impact has been "seriously diminished" by an enforcement scheme that is
beset by under-funding, lack of leadership, absence of coherence, and delay caused by
multiple review levels).
An ADA money suit brought by the United States in behalf of individuals may not
constitute an effective alternative to individual suits even when there is adequate political
will and financial resources. In United States v. Mississippi Department of Public Safety,
153 F. Supp.2d (S.D. Miss. 2001), the Justice Department brought an ADA Title II suit in
behalf of an individual who had been dismissed from the Mississippi Department of Public
Safety training academy, allegedly in violation of the ADA. The court dismissed both the
claim for money damages and the request for injunctive relief. With respect to money
damages, the court held that when the United States is not alleging a "pattern or practice"
of discrimination, the "United States seeks only to vindicate the rights of an individual[,J
... step[s] into the shoes of a private individual[,] [and] [i]n this capacity has no more
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their sovereign immunity and permit themselves to be sued by individuals for
money damages."° These options are beyond the control of individual plain-
tiffs and their efficacy is subject to reasonable doubt. 101 But Garrett pre-
serves other options that public employees may deploy in their discretion to
remedy violations of ADA rights. They are: 1) ADA Title I suits against
local government for money damages; 2) the continuing ability to sue states
for money damages to redress ADA violations arising from invidious dis-
crimination; and 3) suits against state officers. These remedies are discussed
next. In addition, Garrett does not address Congress' ability to purchase a
waiver of a state's judicial immunity through the federal government's spend-
ing power, a point analyzed in Part V within a larger discussion of potential
political responses to Garrett.
A. ADA Suits Against Local Government for Money Damages
State sovereign immunity applies only to the state, state agencies, and
other entities considered arms of the state.102 State sovereign immunity does
not extend, however, to a state's political subdivisions. 0 3 Accordingly, Gar-
rett does not affect private ADA Title I damage actions against many units of
local government. 10 4 The apparent simplicity of the arm of the state/state
power to sue a state than the individual it represents." Id. at *2. With respect to the
request for injunctive relief, the court held that in non-pattern-and-practice suits the
"United States has no more power to sue a state than the individual it represents," and
since the individual's right to injunctive relief requires naming a state officer as defendant
in the litigation (see discussion infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text), the United
States injunction request must be dismissed since the suit named only the state agency as a
defendant. Id. at *3. It is plain that if this reasoning were to take root in the appellate
courts, the alternative of a suit brought by the United States would remove Garrett's ad-
verse affect on the vindication of individual ADA rights only in pattern and practice suits
brought by the government.
100. Though state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to enforce the ADA, Congress is
powerless to compel states to provide their courts jurisdiction to hear suits against the state
to enforce federal statutory rights. See Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 706 (1999). States are free to
decide when to consent to suit in either federal or state court and on what terms absent
"evidence that the State has manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to discrimi-
nate against federal causes of action." Id. at 758. The current evidence is that few states
have consented to suit for money damages by private individuals asserting federal rights.
See Hartley, The Alden Trilogy, supra note 17, at 367-370. See also Minnesota Responds to
Garrett Decision, Other States Consider Waiving Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, 167 Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 233 (June 25, 2001) (reporting a mixed political response to efforts to con-
vince states to waive their sovereign immunity to ADA suits).
101. See discussion supra notes 99-100.
102. It is clear that a statewide agency of state government is an arm of the state. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
103. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (stating that the Eleventh
Amendment is no bar to federal suit against county to collect debt); Workman v. New
York, 179 U.S. 552, 563-66 (1900) (discussing that this is the same with respect to cities).
See also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 89 n.34 (1984) ("IT]he
Eleventh Amendment does not apply to 'counties and similar municipal corporations,"'
(quoting Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977))).
104. See, e.g., Parker v. Anne Arundel County, No. Civ.A. WMN-00-850, 2001 WL
282695 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2001) (discussing that Garrett is not applicable to ADA suit for
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political subdivision dichotomy can be misleading. In fact, its application has
befuddled many courts 105 and has generated considerable criticism. 10 6 The
dichotomy creates practical difficulties for a variety of reasons.
First, many governmental entities are not clearly either an arm of the state
or a state political subdivision since they possess attributes of both.10 7 "Even
the more traditional state-created bodies, such as public universities, school
districts, and highway and transit agencies, cannot always be placed squarely
in the alter ego-political subdivision dichotomy."'1 8 Second, the Supreme
Court has not articulated coherent and workable standards, with the result
that the lower courts tend to craft their own dissimilar, multi-factor tests.10 9
Third, McMillon v. Monroe County, Alabamal10 held that a county sheriff,
locally elected and compensated from local funds, was a state official prima-
rily because he enforced state law. Since many local officials enforce state
law, McMillon opens a potentially wide loophole through which local gov-
erning bodies may be able to claim their state's immunity.
To the extent that one can generalize a prevailing approach to deciding
arm-of-the-state issues, the courts seem to focus primarily on three consider-
damages against county fire department.). The ability to sue county and city governments
in federal court represents a significant limit on Garrett's practical impact. Because so
many important social services are provided by local governing bodies, such as police and
fire protection and education, citizens are most likely to interact with government at the
local level. These interactions create fertile opportunities for conflict with resultant allega-
tions of federal law violation. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 406
(1999).
105. See JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 119 (1987)
("[T]he distinction in Eleventh Amendment law between cities and counties on the one
hand and states on the other produces bizarre results.").
106. See id. See also Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The Eleventh
Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 57 n.23 (1990) (stating that the
distinction is seen as a "doctrinal anomaly"); Gerald E. Frug, The Judicial Power of the
Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 756 (1978) (stating the distinction is anomalous). In fact, a
strong case has been made that the dichotomy cannot be defended based on functional
differences between a state and its political subdivisions. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET. AL.,
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1057 (1996) ("Since a local govern-
ment is a creature of the state, it is hard to see any functional basis for distinguishing the
two.").
107. See Alex E. Rogers, Clothing State Governmental Entities With Sovereign Immu-
nity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
1243, 1243 (1992).
108. Id. But the "vast majority" of appellate cases have found that state universities
share in their states' immunity. See Sherman v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 16 F.3d 860, 863
n.3 (8th Cir. 1994) (listing appellate decisions finding state universities or colleges immune
from suit in federal court).
109. See Rogers, supra note 107, at 1243-44 (by "vary[ing] ... the relative weight of
each factor, [the lower courts] ... generate conflicting results."). The contradictory results
produced by the lower courts' application of arm-of-the-state standards is widely acknowl-
edged. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, at 407-08; 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.11 (3d ed. 1998).
110. 520 U.S. 781 (1997).
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ations, all of which vary depending on the vagaries of each state's law."1
First is the likely impact of the litigation on the state's treasury. The courts
will accord a governing entity judicial immunity when the relief granted
would run directly against the state. 1 2 The crucial factors are the level of
state cooperation between state and local officials anticipated by state law,
and whether the source of funding comes exclusively or primarily from the
state.11 3 In most cases the source of funding of a judgment is the predomi-
nant issue1 14 and the answer depends entirely on state law - usually whether
the governing entity has independent authority to generate revenue.1 5 In
state university cases, the state university's financial dependence on the state
usually is the crucial inquiry'1 6 but when the degree of that dependence is
uncertain close questions can arise whether a university is an in arm of the
state enjoying the state's sovereign immunity." 7 In addition to examining
111. See Ivan E. Bodensteiner & Rosalie B. Levinson, Litigating Age and Disability
Claims Against State and Local Government Employers in the New "Federalism" Era, 22
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 99, 103 n.28 ("Determining the status of state agencies re-
quires a careful review of state law .... ").
112. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123 n.34 (1984).
113. See id. at 123-24; See also Crane v. Texas, 759 F.2d 412, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1985)
("[T]he most crucial factor to be considered in determining the County's status is 'whether
the funds to defray any award would be derived from the state treasury."' (quoting Laje v.
R.E. Thomason General Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir. 1982))).
114. See, e.g., Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir.
1995) ("The critical factor in [determining whether a suit is in reality a suit against the
state] is 'whether any judgment rendered against the [agency] would ultimately come out
of state funds."' (quoting Sherman v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 16 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.
1994))); Parker v. Anne Arundel County, No. Civ.A. WMN-00-850, 2001 WL 282695 at *3
(D. Md. Mar. 19, 2001) (stating that the county fire department may be sued for damages
in an ADA action, with the court finding that in deciding arm-of-the-state issues, "the first,
and key, question is whether the state treasury will be affected."); accord Bodensteiner &
Levinson, supra note 111, at 104-05 n.29 (demonstrating that source of funds that will sat-
isfy any judgment is an important threshold question in arm-of-the-state litigation). See
also Access Living Metro v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 00 C 0770, 2001 WL 818789 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 12, 2001) (discussing in an ADA suit where the court denied transit authority's
arm-of-the-state status: the extent of the entity's financial autonomy from the state is criti-
cal along with its legal status under state law and whether it serves the entire state or only a
specific region).
115. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977) (dis-
cussing that the school district is not an arm of the state because, among other things,
under state law the district possessed power to issue bonds and levy taxes).
116. See, e.g., Dover Elevator, 64 F.3d at 446-47 (discussing that the state university is
an arm of the state because spending dependent on state appropriation); Hutsell v. Sayre, 5
F.3d 996, 999-1002 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating the University of Kentucky is an arm of the
state: university budget set by state and judgments would be paid by state); Bunch v. City
Univ. of New York, No. 98 CIV. 1172(AKH), 2000 WL 1457078 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2000)
(stating the university and affiliated research institute are entitled to sovereign immunity
on ADA claim because state was responsible for paying any resulting judgments).
117. See Sherman, 16 F.3d at 863 (remanding to ascertain whether payment of judg-
ment will in fact come from state appropriation in light of allegation that two-thirds of
university budget is not financed by state appropriation).
University bookstore cases can present interesting sovereign immunity issues. In
Swallows v. Barnes & Noble Book Stores, 128 F.3d 990 (6th Cir. 1997), the Tennessee
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the source of funds to satisfy judgments, courts also examine the autonomy of
the governing body from the state. Significant autonomy evidences that the
entity is not an arm of the state. 118 Lastly, how the state characterizes a local
governing entity under state law, its relationship with the state, and the func-
tion the entity serves also are probative of whether the entity is an arm of the
state.
11 9
B. ADA Suits Based on Invidious Discrimination
Even when an action is a suit against the state, Garrett may preserve some
private ADA Title I damage actions - those that allege state disability-based
discrimination of such severity that it violates the Constitution. Those who
have read Garrett carefully might wince at this assertion since Garrett con-
tains language that could lead one to conclude, perhaps correctly, that no
ADA Title I suit for money damages may be brought against the States fol-
lowing Garrett. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist posed the
issue in Garrett as "whether employees of the State of Alabama may recover
money damages by reason of the State's failure to comply with the provisions
of Title I of the [ADA]. We hold that such suits are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.' 120 Literally read, this language bars all private Title I actions
for damages against the States, including actions alleging an ADA violation
that constitutes state action that also is unconstitutional. It is useful, how-
Technological University had turned over its bookstore operation to a private corporation.
In an ADA and ADEA action brought by three employees, the court held that the private
corporation and not the state university was the employer, rejecting the argument that the
two were an integrated enterprise. The court looked to: 1) interrelation of operations, 2)
evidence of common management, 3) evidence that the university controlled the bookstore
employees' labor relations, and 4) evidence of common ownership or financial control.
Swallows raises the interesting question of whether the bookstore would have enjoyed the
state university's sovereign immunity if the court had held the two were an integrated
enterprise.
118. See, e.g., Parker, 2001 WL 282695 at *3 (finding that county fire department not an
arm of the state in part because state sets only minimum standards and county otherwise is
free to make independent judgments).
119. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist., 429 U.S. at 280-81 (focusing on characteriza-
tion of school district under state law as a political subdivision and not an arm of the state);
Rounds v. Oregon State Bd. of Higher Educ., 166 F.3d 1032, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 1999) (find-
ing university is arm of the state because of the central governmental functions it performs
under the control of the state); Chafetz v. Roosevelt Island Operating Corp., No. 97 Civ.
0761(NRB), 2000 WL 1277337 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2000) (examining traditional state powers
a state gave to a public corporation, the governor's power to remove members from en-
tity's governing board, and the state's responsibility for the corporation's operations and
governance in addition to the consideration of the state obligation to indemnify).
120. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 960. Later, the Court posed the issue as "whether an individ-
ual may sue a State for money damages in federal court under the ADA." Id. at 961 (cita-
tion omitted). The Court held no because "Congress did not validly abrogate the States'
sovereign immunity from suit by private individuals for money damages under Title I ...."
Id. at 968 n.9. See also Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 969 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("the predicate
for money damages against an unconsenting State in suits brought by private persons must
be a federal statute enacted upon the documentation of patterns of constitutional viola-
tions committed by the State in its official capacity.").
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ever, to pause and consider whether all of the justices who voted with the
majority in Garrett likely intended this overarching result.
121
If private ADA Title I suits for damages that allege unconstitutional disa-
bility-based discrimination by the States do not survive Garrett, why is this
so? One possibility is that Garrett stands for the underlying, unstated pro-
position that Congress may not legislate through its Section 5 power, even to
proscribe unconstitutional state action, unless Congress first identifies a pat-
tern of unconstitutionality. This reading of Garrett is not defensible. First,
this would be an extreme departure from any holding or rationale in any
previous Section 5 case the Court has decided. 122 Second, no lower court has
ever held that Congress may not exercise its Section 5 power to prohibit con-
duct the Constitution proscribes, unless Congress first demonstrates a pattern
of unconstitutionality. Third, the Garrett case was briefed by both sides as a
case focusing on the issue of whether Congress could proscribe in the ADA,
conduct that is not itself unconstitutional.123 Fourth, the only provisions of
121. The point is not merely academic. The Fourteenth Amendment does not provide
a self-enforcing private right of action and the States are not "persons" under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). It is true that one
may always obtain injunctive relief against state officers responsible for violating constitu-
tional rights. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (Eleventh Amendment no bar to
actions for prospective relief against state officers sued in their official capacity). But
Young does not provide a mechanism for recovery of money damages. It also is true that
§ 1983 money damage suits may be brought against state officers, sued in their individual
capacities, who violate one's constitutional rights. See authority cited infra notes 189-93.
The efficacy of such suits is severely limited, however, by the doctrine of qualified immu-
nity. See discussion infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text. Plus recovery is against the
state officer individually, possibly making enforcement of a money judgment problematic
except when a state indemnifies its state officers. See discussion infra note 184 and accom-
panying text.
122. See Gottesman, supra note 42, at 47-67 (reviewing all of the Court's Section 5
cases prior to Garrett). To read into Garrett an overarching requirement that Congress
identify a pattern of unconstitutionality as a prerequisite for any valid exercise of its Sec-
tion 5 power leads to the extravagant claim that, absent such a pattern, Congress could not
even enact legislation that parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet
Congress' power to prohibit what the judiciary would find is unconstitutional always has
been understood to be the irreducible minimum scope of the Section 5 power. See Kimel
v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000). ("Congress' § 5 power is not confined to
enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."). In Garrett itself, the majority began its Section 5 analysis by reiterating that the
Congress' Section 5 power to "enforce" the provisions of Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment "is not limited to mere legislative repetition of this Court's constitutional ju-
risprudence," suggesting again that the Section 5 power certainly includes the power to
enact a "mere repetition" of constitutional guarantees. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963.
123. See Brief for Petitioner at 29, Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 2000
WL 821035 (June 22, 2000) (No. 99-1240) (arguing that extending the ADA to the States is
unconstitutional because "Judicial review under the ADA is far more rigorous that it is
under the Equal Protection Clause," citing the ADA's provisions requiring reasonable ac-
commodations, prohibiting employment standards that have a disparate impact, and pro-
scribing the refusal to make reasonable modifications in public services.); Brief for
Respondent at 13, 2000 WL 1593420 (Aug. 11, 2000) (No. 99-1240) (arguing that the
Court's prior decisions "at the least" permit Congress to prevent conduct transgressing the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the only "complex" issue is the scope of the Congress' power
20011
64 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW
the ADA that the Court in Garrett cited with disapproval were sections
whose proscriptions substantially exceed those in the Constitution.124 Fi-
nally, and more fundamentally, the reason for requiring a pattern of state
unconstitutional conduct in Section 5 cases is to confirm that the real aim of
the legislation is eradication of unconstitutional behavior and not "Con-
gress['s] . .. rewrit[ing] the Fourteenth Amendment law laid down by th[e]
Court .... -"125 By definition, federal legislation that proscribes only uncon-
stitutional state action does not threaten this separation-of-powers
principle.
126
Another possible explanation that would permit the Garrett majority's
broad language to be read literally, but without rewriting Section 5 doctrine,
is that the unconstitutionality of Title I's overbreadth rendered all Title I pri-
vate suits for money damages unenforceable against the States as a matter of
statutory construction. That is to say, the Court's broad language might be
read as stating an implicit conclusion that because most private Title I suits
against the States for money damages are unconstitutional after Garrett, Con-
gress did not intend to retain any Title I private money damage actions
against the States. 27 This reading of Garrett seems strained and highly prob-
lematic. First, the Garrett majority opinion makes no reference to such a
congressional intent. Nor would one think that all the members of the Court
who supported the Garrett majority opinion would sub silento conclude such
to enact broader legislation using the "congruent/proportional prong" of the analytical
framework developed by Boerne and its progeny).
124. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967 (citing ADA Sections requiring that facilities be
made "readily accessible" and that employers provide "reasonable accommodations," and
citing the ADA's ban on certain employment standards or criteria that result in a disparate
impact on persons with a disability).
125. Id. at 968. See also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 ("Our task is to determine whether the
ADEA is in fact [a regulation of constitutional conduct as] an appropriate remedy [for
unconstitutional conduct] or, instead, merely an attempt to substantively redefine the
States' legal obligations with respect to age discrimination.").
126. This theory has been adopted in at least one post-Garrett decision with respect to
ADA Title II. See Garcia v. S.U.N.Y Health Ctr. Of Brooklyn, No. 00-9223, 2001 WL
1159970 at *9 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2001) (Even though ADA Title II in its entirety fails to
meet the Court's congruence and proportionality test, "[w]e hold that a private suit for
money damages under Title 1I of the ADA may ... be maintained against a state [even
after Garrett] if the plaintiff can establish that the Title II violation was motivated by either
discriminatory animus or ill will due to disability."); id. ("To establish discriminatory ani-
mus . . . a plaintiff may rely on a burden-shifting technique similar to that adopted in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973), or a motivating-factor
analysis similar to that set out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252-58
(1980).").
127. The ADA contains a severability clause, §12213, but it is not dispositive of the
question. It provides: "[s]hould any provision in this chapter be found to be unconstitu-
tional by a court of law, such provision shall be severed from the remainder of the chapter,
and such action shall not affect the enforceability of the remaining provisions of the chap-
ter." 42 U.S.C. §12213 (1994). Since the Court in Garrett found certain applications of the
ADA to be unconstitutional (private damage actions against the States) but did not find
any "provision[ I" of the ADA unconstitutional, the statute's severability provision is not
applicable in this context.
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an intent since finding it has such a profound adverse effect on Title I's future
efficacy. Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history of the ADA
that remotely suggests such an intent by the Congress. For all of these rea-
sons, a more plausible reading of Garrett is that the broad language concern-
ing the termination of all Title I private rights of action against the States for
money damages is unintended and not likely a considered consensus of all
five members of the Garrett majority.
128
If Garrett does preserve a private Title I damage action against the States
to remedy unconstitutional disability-based discrimination, one needs to clar-
ify two things: 1) the disability-based discrimination the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits, and 2) the ADA Title I claims that survive Garrett because
these claims simply constitute proving state action involving such unconstitu-
tional disability-based discrimination.
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,"29 the Court held that
legislative classifications affecting persons with disabilities are not suspect
classifications.130 0 Accordingly, disability-based discrimination rates only a
rational basis standard of judicial review. "The general rule is that [such]
legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.'
13'
This test opens two avenues to argue unconstitutionality.
128. Estate of Langan v. Nebraska, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Neb. 1999), a pre-Garrett
decision, held that the invalid portions of ADA Title I may not be so severed so as to
preserve a private damage action against the States for invidious discrimination. The
Court reasoned as follows: 1) The ADA prohibits invidious discrimination only against a
"qualified individual with a disability" 42 U.S.C. §12112(a) (1994); 2) the ADA defines
"qualified individual with a disability" as one who can perform a job's essential functions
"with or without a reasonable accommodation" 42 U.S.C. §12111(b) (1994); 3) ADA dis-
crimination suits cannot be adjudicated therefore without interpreting and applying the
term "reasonable accommodation;" 4) the States' sovereign immunity prohibits requiring
the States to provide a reasonable accommodation; 5) the constitutional portions of the
ADA (the prohibitions against invidious discrimination) cannot therefore function inde-
pendently from the unconstitutional portions (requiring that the States provide a reasona-
ble accommodation); and 6) therefore, the ADA cannot be severed. Id. at 1026-27.
This reasoning cannot sustain scrutiny. First of all, a claim of invidious discrimination
does not entail requiring a state to provide a reasonable accommodation; therefore enforc-
ing ADA's prohibitions against invidious discrimination does not even remotely implicate
enforcing or even interpreting any unconstitutional provision of the ADA. Second, noth-
ing in a state's sovereign immunity protects it from the federal obligation to provide a
reasonable accommodation. Sovereign immunity merely protects a state from a money
damage remedy for failure to provide it. See discussion supra note 98 and accompanying
text. Accordingly, the valid portion of the ADA, prohibiting invidious discrimination,
functions independently from the invalid portion of providing a private damage action
when a state fails to provide a reasonable accommodation.
129. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
130. The case specifically addressed individuals with mental disabilities, but in Garrett,
the Court applied this holding to all categories of people with a disability. See Garrett, 121
S. Ct. at 963-64.
131. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
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First, the ends must be "legitimate.' 1 32 Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits invidious discrimination, defined as discrimination "rooted in con-
siderations that the Constitution will not tolerate" 133 such as malice or ani-
mus or "a bare ... desire to harm a politically unpopular group. '134 If the
ends sought to be achieved by a state are contrary to the requirements of
valid federal law, then, by definition, the Supremacy Clause of the Constitu-
tion 135 renders those ends no longer legitimate.
136
Second, even when the ends are legitimate, under rational basis review
States must always use means to achieve those ends that "rationally further
the [legitimate] purpose identified by the State.' 37 Legislatively chosen
means, therefore, that are the product of "mere negative attitudes, or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable ... are not permis-
sible bases for treating [persons with disabilities] differently .... "138 The
Equal Protection Clause prohibits legislative classifications harming the dis-
abled that are based on "vague, undifferentiated fears. '139 Accordingly, em-
ployment decisions made with an indifference to the facts may be
unconstitutional when the indifference is based on irrational myths, fears or
stereotypes about the disabled.
1 400
132. A classification evaluated under a rational basis standard of review "cannot run
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause if there is a rational relationship between the dispar-
ity of treatment and some legitimate governmental purpose." Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964
(quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993).
133. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
134. Id. at 447 (citing United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)). Accord Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). In Cleburne, the Court held uncon-
stitutional a Texas city's denial of a special use permit for a group home for developmen-
tally impaired persons, finding a prejudicial motive primarily from the underinclusiveness
of the reasons advanced for denying the permit but also from the city's willingness to ac-
cede to the prejudicial attitudes of some local residents. As the Court stated, "[pirivate
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect." Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433
(1984)).
135. U.S. CONST. art. VI. ("[T]his Constitution and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
136. In this regard it is essential to keep in mind that Garrett was a remedy case and did
not disturb the States' Title I obligations. See discussion supra notes 98 & 128 and accom-
panying text.
137. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964 (quoting Massachusetts Bd. Of Retirement v. Murgia,
427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976) (per curiam)).
138. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448. In Garrett, the Court emphasized that state action
based on negative attitudes and fear, without more, is not a priori irrational. ("[T]heir
presence alone does not a constitutional violation make."). Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964. It is
state action based on negative attitudes or fear "unsubstantiated by factors which are prop-
erly cognizable" that is impermissible. Id. (emphasis added).
139. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 449. See also Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 611 (1999)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[Alnimus can lead to false and unjustified stereotypes, and
vice versa.").
140. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) ("[Elven in the ordinary equal pro-
tection case calling for the most deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation
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At least three types of ADA causes of action for money damages would
seem to survive Garrett because they each entail proving facts that also make
out a violation of the Equal Protection Clause:
The first is adverse action taken against a person with a disability because
of animus or irrational myths, fears or stereotypes. ADA section 12112(a)
states a general prohibition of discrimination against a qualified individual
with a disability "because of the disability." In addition, ADA section
12112(b)(1) proscribes "limiting, segregating, or classifying a[n] ... employee
in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such ... em-
ployee because of the disability of such . . . employee." Interpreting the
ADA's legislative history, the EEOC has explained that section 12112(b)(1)
is intended to prohibit restricting employment opportunities of persons with
disabilities "on the basis of stereotypes and myths about the individual's disa-
bility.' 14 1 Differential treatment because of one's status of being disabled, as
opposed to differentiation because of any rational understanding of the limi-
tations that one's disability actually creates, violates these sections and also is
unconstitutional when it can be shown to reflect either 1) "prejudice and an-
tipathy - a view that [those being treated differently] are not as worthy or
deserving as others,"'142 2) "mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated
by factors which are properly cognizable,"' 143 3) "vague, undifferentiated
fears' of others,144 or 4) some other irrational prejudice. In Cleburne, the
Court explained that disability distinctions are "largely irrelevant unless the
[regulated behavior by the disabled] would threaten legitimate interests of
the [government] in a way that other permitted [behavior] would not.'
'1 45
Categorical exclusions based on irrational assumptions can never meet this
test.
146
between the classification adopted and the object to be attained.") Id. at 635 (holding that
a rational basis cannot be built on an incorrect belief having an irrational foundation be-
cause the constitutionality of "status-based enactment[s]" depends on a "factual context
from which we could discern a relationship to legitimate states interests .. ") (emphasis
added).
141. See Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. §1630.5
Appendix (2000) [hereinafter EEOC Interpretive Guidance].
142. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
143. Id. at 448.
144. Id. at 449.
145. Id. at 447-48. See also Mark C. Weber, Beyond the Americans With Disabilities
Act: A National Employment Policy for People with Disabilities, 46 BuFF. L. REV. 123, 132
n.46 (1998) ("The essence of invidious discrimination is being treated worse than others
because of a trait that one has no control over and that has no just relation to the entitle-
ment at issue.").
146. This conclusion is not at odds with the observation in Garrett that the State need
not articulate its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made. Rather, the "bur-
den is upon the challenging party to negative any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for the classification." Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 972 (quoting
Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993), quoting FCC v. Beach Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307,
313 (1993)). This language simply informs the lower courts regarding proper jury instruc-
tions on burden of proof. My point is that if, after being instructed properly, the jury
concludes that an invidious motive was the actuating force in an adverse employment ac-
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ADA suits alleging such irrational bases for adverse employment action
are relatively common. For example, the EEOC obtained a verdict for
money damages against an employer operating a retail store upon evidence
that the regional manager ordered that a newly hired janitor with mental
retardation be fired because the employer does not hire "those kinds of peo-
ple. '147 A plaintiff suffering paraplegia recovered a verdict for money dam-
ages against an employer who refused six times to hire the plaintiff because it
had "no openings for a person in a wheelchair. '" 148 A Navy depot in Califor-
nia was ordered to pay a woman money damages because a supervisor re-
fused to permit her to use her wheelchair in the office, thus forcing her to use
crutches, refused a request for an "out box," required her to carry heavy files
to their destination, ordered other employees not to assist her, and finally
fired her.149 A jury awarded a teacher with muscular dystrophy money dam-
ages after rejecting as pretextual a school district's explanation of why it re-
fused to hire the teacher, who had graduated magna cum laude, and hired
instead a teacher who scored D's and F's in his math curriculum in college.
The jury found that the motive for the refusal to hire was the fact that the
plaintiff had a disability.1500
Garrett should not affect the outcome of cases such as these when they
involve a state government, one of its agencies, or an arm of the state. Gar-
rett should permit a suit against the state for money damages when the jury is
instructed to find an ADA violation only upon evidence demonstrating that
the state had acted out of prejudice and antipathy, or out of mere negative
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable,
or from vague, undifferentiated fears, or some other irrational basis. Then
the ADA cause of action merely is alleging unconstitutional conduct.
151
tion then that action is unconstitutional and may be remedied through a Title I damage
action against the States.
147. EEOC Gets $13 Million Verdict in ADA Employment Case, 16 Disability Compli-
ance Bull. (LRP) 3 (Nov. 18, 1999).
148. Man With Paraplegia Wins $3.5 Million Verdict Against Wal-Mart, 10 Disability
Compliance Bull. (LRP) 3 (Nov. 20, 1997).
149. See Navy Pays $300,000 To Woman With Arthritis, 10 Disability Compliance Bull.
(LRP) 2 (Nov. 20, 1997) (reporting that in this action brought under the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, the Department of Navy recommended that the court issue a judgment against it
for this behavior).
150. See Jury: Principal Denied Job To Teacher Because of Disability, 10 Disability
Compliance Bull. (LRP) 3 (Oct. 23, 1997) (reporting that the teacher, who had completed
his student teaching at that school, had "recorded the highest grades possible as a student-
teacher .. "). In a non-employment case, a motel agreed to pay $92,000 to two mothers
whose sons were not permitted to stay at the motel because the sons have cerebral palsy
and use wheelchairs. The motel, after first registering the mothers, later took back the
room key and refunded the money for the room, telling the mothers that "'handicapped
persons could not stay at [this motel]." See Update: The Latest Litigation in Progress and
Other News of Note, 8 Disability Compliance Bull. (LRP) 2 (Sept. 26, 1996).
151. A "cutting edge" ADA legal theory that might therefore survive Garrett is one
that depends upon a demonstration of a denial of procedural due process. A state univer-
sity has been sued following its discharge of an employee with a mental disability. The
legal theory is that the university's normal employment practice is to provide its employees
notice and a hearing prior to discharge. But this practice was abandoned in the case of the
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A second ADA Title I cause of action that should survive Garrett is one
alleging a hostile work environment. Title I's text does not explicitly provide
a cause of action for harassment or creating a hostile work environment.
Nevertheless, the EEOC and the Department of Justice have maintained in
their regulatory materials that harassment based on disability violates the
ADA.5 2 It was not until the Fifth Circuit's March 2001 decision in Flowers v.
Southern Regional Physicians Services, Inc.,153 however, that a circuit court of
appeals held that the ADA creates a cause of action for disability-based har-
assment that creates a hostile work environment) 54 Several weeks later, in
Fox v. General Motors Corp., the Fourth Circuit became the second federal
court of appeals to so hold.
155
If the employer in each of these two cases had been a state or arm of a
state, the discriminatory acts described in these decisions would likely have
constituted a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. In Flowers, the plain-
tiff disclosed to her immediate supervisor that she was HIV-positive. Almost
immediately after this disclosure, the supervisor shunned Flowers and began
eavesdropping on her conversations and spying on her at work. In addition,
the defendant's regional president became cold toward Flowers, refused to
shake her hand and openly avoided her at work. Flowers was made to un-
dergo four drug tests in a one week period, despite the fact that she had
never tested positive for drug use in the past. Further, she was written up
three times in a row, starting one month after her disclosure, each time in a
manner that the court likened to an "ambush." After the second write-up,
she was placed on ninety days' probation, at the end of which period she was
written up again and placed on probation a second time. In addition, she was
treated in a hostile manner by the regional president, who went so far as to
call her a "bitch." Ultimately, Flowers, who had formerly been considered a
good employee, was fired.156 The court of appeals concluded the evidence
mentally disabled plaintiff allegedly because the university "saw an opportunity to do so
based on [plaintiff's] disability-related limitations." See Suit: University Forced Resignation
Based on Worker's Mental Disability, 20 Disability Compliance Bull. (LRP) 7 (Apr. 5,
2001). Reduced to its essentials, the suit alleges that the university denied plaintiff an
established condition of employment (procedural due process) because he was a person
with a disability. Stated as a constitutional theory, the claim is either a denial of procedural
due process or a denial of equal protection (disparate treatment trammeling the fundamen-
tal constitutional right to procedural due process) because of plaintiff's disability. How-
ever viewed, this ADA statutory claim is rooted in an allegation of state action that is
unconstitutional.
152. See Harassment Claims Available Under Different Titles of ADA, 18 Disability
Compliance Bull. (LRP) 9 (Sept. 21, 2000) (citing to EEOC regulations, 29 CFR §1630.12
and Department of Justice Technical Assistance Manual); see also Disability-Based Harass-
ment Claims Begin to Move Into ADA Spotlight, 19 Disability Compliance Bull. (LRP) 7
(Jan. 11, 2001) (same).
153. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001).
154. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits previously had assumed that the ADA cre-
ates such a claim and the cause of action had been recognized in district courts in Georgia,
Ohio, Puerto Rico, Virginia, and West Virginia. See id. at 232-34 (citing authority).
155. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001).
156. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 231-32, 236-37.
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was sufficient for a jury to find that she was harassed "because of her status
as an HIV-positive individual and that this harassment was so severe and
pervasive that it unreasonably interfered with her job performance.'
'1 57
The Fox decision also makes out a compelling case of Equal Protection
violation if the employer had been engaged in state action. There, an em-
ployee was placed on light duty after injuring his back. Other supervisors
and co-workers, apparently resenting his work assignment, began harassing
him and ordering him to perform tasks beyond his medical restrictions. One
supervisor was reported to have stated: "I don't need any of you handicapped
M - F - s. As far as I am concerned, you can go the H - home. ' 158 After the
employee's physician issued new medical restrictions, a supervisor responded
by assigning the employee to a table that was located in a hazardous area and
that was far too small for his 6-foot-7-inch height, resulting in aggravating his
back condition. 159 There was testimony that a supervisor referred to persons
with a disability as "handicapped M [-]F [-]s" and that the plaintiff and other
disabled employees were the targets of "constant verbal harassment and in-
sults." 160 0 One employee testified that a supervisor instructed the employees
at the facility not to talk to disabled employees who were treated "like they
had a disease."' 161 The court noted that supervisors "constantly" directed vul-
gar and profane language at disabled employees. 62 The court concluded that
the evidence fully supported the jury's finding of harassment directly attribu-
table to the employee's disability of such severity and pervasiveness that a
reasonable person would have perceived the environment as hostile.
1 63
Almost by definition, the hostile environment cases arising out of disabil-
ity-based harassment creating a hostile work environment entail conduct that
a jury, following properly drafted limiting instructions, could find did not ad-
vance any legitimate state interest and arose out of prejudice and antipathy,
or out of mere negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which
are properly cognizable, or from vague, undifferentiated fears, or some other
irrational basis. Therefore, most ADA hostile environment cases entail con-
duct violative of the Equal Protection Clause.164
157. Id. at 237.
158. Fox, 247 F.3d at 173.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 174.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 179.
164. A good example might be the jury verdict against the New Jersey Department of
Environmental Services. See Jury Decides Against N.J. in "Hostile Environment" Harass-
ment Case, 14 Disability Compliance Bull. (LRP) 1 (Feb. 11, 1999). There, the jury
awarded money damages to a radio dispatcher with the Bureau of Law Enforcement of the
Division of Fish, Game, and Wildlife who had a lifelong history of learning disabilities,
including dyslexia. The employee was the target of jokes and ridicule because of his disa-
bility. Supervisors and co-workers routinely referred to him as "stupid" and a "moron."
Some supervisors mimicked the facial expressions and sounds of mentally retarded people
when they talked to him. The taunting escalated to violence when a supervisor chased the
employee with pepper spray and discharged the spray in the employee's face. One law
enforcement officer working for the employer actually drew his weapon and pointed it
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A third ADA private cause of action for money damages that should sur-
vive Garrett is an ADA action for retaliation brought under ADA section
12203(b).1 65 This section is located in Title V, the ADA's miscellaneous pro-
visions, not in Title 1.166 This section prohibits acts that
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exer-
cise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or
enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any
other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or
protected by this chapter.
Public agencies often have been accused of unlawful disability-based retal-
iation. For example, the Department of Justice sued an Indiana town on be-
half of an employee who worked as a dispatcher for the town's police
department.1 67 The employee had filed an administrative charge against the
town in 1997 alleging the town's health insurance plan contravened provi-
sions of the ADA. Thereafter, the town began to subject the employee to
"'unreasonable scrutiny, reprimands, and suspensions." '168 The employee
then filed ADA charges with the EEOC alleging retaliation and was thereaf-
ter fired. In such a case, if it could be proved that the employer retaliated
against the employee for exercising a right guaranteed by valid federal law,
then by definition, the employer's treatment of the employee would not be to
accomplish a legitimate state interest.1 69 In other words, the conduct would
be unconstitutional. Thus even if the employer were a state government and
even if the plaintiff were an individual seeking money damages, Garrett
over the employee's head. Other law enforcement officers routinely aimed their pepper
spray at the employee and grabbed for their weapons pretending to be about ready to draw
the weapon and shoot the plaintiff. When plaintiff asked that the harassment stop, a super-
visor responded that he should "get used to the locker room atmosphere." Id. at 10. An-
other supervisor told plaintiff that these things were done to him to relieve their stress and
he was their "White Rodney King." Id.
165. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b).
166. It should be noted that the lower courts are divided on the question of whether
compensatory and punitive damages are available for violation of ADA's section 12203.
Compensatory and punitive damages are available in ADA litigation by virtue of section
102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981A. Section 102 provides for damages
for several sections of the ADA but does not include Title V, the location of ADA section
12203. One court, therefore, has concluded that damages are not available for unlawful
retaliation under the ADA. See Brown v. Lee's Summit, Missouri, No. 98-0438-CV-W-2,
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17671 (W.D. Mo. June 1, 1996). The contrary conclusion has more
often prevailed. See, e.g., Muller v. Costello, 997 F. Supp. 299, 302-03 (N.D.N.Y. 1998)
(collecting cases and holding that compensatory damages are available against a public
entity but subject to statutory cap provided in 42 U.S.C. § 1981A(a)(2)); Ostrach v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal., 957 F. Supp. 196 (E.D. Cal. 1997); Niece v. Fitzner, 922 F. Supp.
1208 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (ADA Title II action).
167. See Justice Department Suit Alleges That Town Retaliated Against Worker, 16 Disa-
bility Compliance Bull. (LRP) 3 (Nov. 18, 1999).
168. Id.
169. At a minimum, the Constitution's Supremacy Clause renders illegitimate any gov-
ernmental action designed to victimize one for exercising rights guaranteed by a valid fed-
eral law.
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should not preclude a federal court from hearing these ADA cases alleging
retaliation because they simply entail proving unconstitutional
discrimination.
Other retaliation suits have involved allegations of a town firing an em-
ployee because he obtained a settlement in an ADA lawsuit against the mu-
nicipality,1700 of a school board retaliating against a child with Down's
Syndrome because the parents of the child had pursued rights protected by
the ADA on behalf of the child, 171 and of an employer retaliating against a
supervisor who opposed the removal of an accommodation for and the dis-
charge of an employee suffering from epilepsy. 172 When plaintiffs prove such
allegations of retaliation for exercising rights protected by federal law, the
employer's motive no longer is legitimate. Thus, even if the employer were a
state, the discrimination would constitute a violation of Equal Protection be-
cause the action cannot be said to be rationally related to the advancement of
a legitimate state interest. Accordingly, such causes of action against a state
for money damages to remedy retaliation should survive Garrett.
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Demshki v. Monteith173 challenges the
above conclusion that at least some ADA retaliation claims against the state
seeking money damages survive Garrett. There, a staff member working for
a committee of the California legislature, the California Senate Rules Com-
mittee, alleged that he was fired by the Committee the day after he opposed
the way the Committee had treated a disabled person who had applied for a
job with the Committee. The plaintiff alleged the discharge constituted retal-
iation in violation of ADA section 12203. Prior to Garrett, the district court
denied the Committee's Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. The Com-
mittee appealed but the court of appeals agreed to a stay until the Supreme
Court decided Garrett. After Garrett, the court of appeals reversed the dis-
trict court without oral argument. 174 The court held that the Title I holding
of Garrett applied equally to a Title V claim challenging retaliation pursuant
to ADA section 12203 because retaliation claims are predicated on rights
protected by Title I. The court reasoned that, as with Title I, Congress did
not find a pattern of unconstitutional retaliation when it enacted Title V's
proscriptions on retaliation. Accordingly, the court concluded, a plaintiff
may not bring an ADA retaliation action for damages against an agency of
state government.
The post-Garrett decision in Demshki, rendered without the benefit of oral
argument, never considered the issues raised and analyzed above. First, the
170. See DOJ Accuses New Mexico Town of Retaliating Against Employee, 10 Disabil-
ity Compliance Bull. (LRP) 7 (Oct. 9, 1997).
171. See Jury Finds Florida School Liable for Retaliation, Not Discrimination, 12 Disa-
bility Compliance Bull. (LRP) 5 (May 7, 1998).
172. See Foster v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 250 F.3d 1189 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that
a supervisor may not be retaliated against for engaging in activity protected by the ADA,
which includes opposing actions against employees that the supervisor has a good faith,
reasonable belief violates the ADA).
173. 255 F.3d 986 (9th Cir. 2001).
174. Id. at 988.
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court never acknowledged that because Garrett was a remedy case it does not
immunize an arm of state government from its duty to comply with all of the
substantive requirements of ADA Title 1.175 Accordingly, ADA section
12203 merely prohibits retaliation for exercising rights still enforceable
against the States. Second, the court never addressed the question of
whether the alleged retaliation by the Senate Rules Committee violates the
Fourteenth Amendment. Third, the court never addressed the pressing ques-
tion of whether ADA violations that amount to constitutional violations sur-
vive Garrett. Finally, the Court simply assumed that Congress' Section 5
power to enact section 12203 depends on Congress having identified a pat-
tern of unconstitutional state retaliation. But as explained above, a pattern
of unconstitutionality is required only with respect to overbroad Section 5
legislation 176 and most, if not all, ADA section 12203 is not overbroad. Sec-
tion 12203 actions merely make out a statutory violation based on unconstitu-
tional conduct.177 For all of these reasons, courts outside the jurisdiction of
the Ninth Circuit may properly conclude not to follow Demshki.
1 8
C. Suits Against State Officers - Individual and Official Capacity
Suits
The Garrett decision also does not preclude two different types of ADA
suits in federal court brought against state officers. The first are damage ac-
tions against state officers sued in their individual capacity. 179 The second are
suits for prospective relief brought against state officers sued in their official
capacity.1 800 The distinction between these two types of suits is easily lost
175. See discussion supra note 98 and accompanying text.
176. See discussion supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
177. See discussion supra notes 165-72 and accompanying text.
178. As discussed more fully infra notes 189-99, it is important that one not suppose
that a § 1983 action alleging constitutional violations is an adequate substitute for an ADA
remedy for unconstitutional disability-based discrimination. First, the States cannot be
sued under § 1983. Id. Second, § 1983 suits against state officers in their official capacity
may validly seek only prospective relief, not money damages. id. Third, it is true that
plaintiffs may deploy § 1983 to sue state officers in their individual capacity for damages to
remedy state officers' unconstitutional conduct. This is because the ADA was intended to
supplement and not supplant other legal rights of persons with disabilities. See Baum-
gardner v. County of Cook, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1045 (N.D. I11. 2000) (holding that the
ADA does not preempt other causes of action, citing ADA section 12201(b) as evidence of
Congress' intent to leave intact other remedies for persons with disabilities); see id. at 1052-
53 (discussing lower court decisions permitting plaintiffs to bring § 1983 actions alleging
unconstitutional actions by state officers either concurrent with or in lieu of ADA claims).
However, such § 1983 individual capacity officer suits are not an adequate substitute for an
ADA suit against the state because: 1) enforcement of a money judgment is more likely
when the state is a defendant than when a state officer is a defendant except, perhaps, in
states that indemnify state officers and 2) most importantly, states in an ADA action would
not have available the qualified immunity defense that usually defeats plaintiffs in § 1983
suits against state officers. Id. See discussion infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
179. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974). (damage actions brought pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 ).
180. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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resulting in the improper application of Eleventh Amendment doctrine with
respect to each.
Individual Capacity suits: For over a quarter of a century, Eleventh
Amendment doctrine has permitted damage actions against state officers
sued in their individual capacity.1 81 Such suits are not considered a suit
against the state because the state officer, and not the state, is the real party
in interest. 182 It is well established that such suits are not barred by the Elev-
enth Amendment even though the state officials were acting in their official
capacity when committing the alleged violation1 83 and even though "a suit
against a state officer is functionally a suit against the state, for the state
defends the action and pays any adverse judgment.'
' 84
One should resist concluding that individual capacity suits are a meaning-
ful alternative to the private ADA damage action against the state that Gar-
rett found to be unconstitutional. No individual capacity suit can be brought
unless a federal statute imposes obligations on state officers and consequent
liability and the ADA is widely understood as not doing so. 8 5 This impedi-
ment to bringing an individual capacity suit against state officers also is likely
to preclude bringing them against state officers under either the ADEA or
Title VII.186 The same is true with respect to individual capacity suits
181. See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 238 (state governor may be sued for damages in federal
court pursuant to cause of action created by 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for conduct arising out of his
official conduct when the damages are to be paid by the governor himself). See also Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (suit
against federal officials).
182. Cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) (stating damage
action may not be maintained even though state officers are named defendants when "the
action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state.
183. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991).
184. See John C. Jeffries Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84
VA. L. REV. 47, 50 (1998). Indemnification of state officials by the state does not convert
an individual capacity suit into a suit against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, at 416 n.23, 422-23 n.48 (collecting cases); see Jeffries,
supra, at 61 ("Whether a state chooses to recognize a right to indemnification surely cannot
control the availability of federal remedies or the meaning of federal constitutional guaran-
tees."). See generally Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997) (stating that
an agreement by federal government to indemnify state university did not deprive it of
Eleventh Amendment immunity.).
185. See, e.g., Alsbrook v. Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1005 n.8 (8th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 1003 (2000), cert. dismissed on application of both parties, 120 S. Ct. 1265
(2000) (holding that ADA suit brought against state officers sued in their individual capac-
ity must be dismissed because the ADA provides a private right of action only against
entities and not against individuals); id. at 1005 n.8 ("[T]hree [circuits] have held that there
is no liability under Title I against individuals who do not otherwise qualify as 'employers'
under the statutory definition." (citing cases from the 7th, 10th, and 11th Circuits)). Ac-
cord Sullivan v. River Valley Sch. Dist., 197 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 1999); Baird v. Rose, 192
F.3d 462 (4th Cir. 1999).
186. See, e.g., Lissau v. Southern Foods, Inc., 159 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 1998) (Title VII);
Matthews v. Kilroy, 117 F.3d 1420 (6th Cir. 1997) (Title VII); Dici v. Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d
542 (3d Cir. 1996) (Title VII); Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995) (Title
VII); Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402, 403 n.4 (11th Cir. 1995) (ADEA and Title VII.)
Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp., 30 F.3d 507 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1058 (1994)
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brought under the 1973 Rehabilitation Act.1 87 Other federal labor and civil
rights statutes, because of their unique statutory language, do provide for
individual capacity suits against state officers. 1s8
Section 1983 suits 89 are unlikely to provide an efficacious alternative to
bringing ADA money damages suits against states. First of all, a § 1983 suit
does not provide a cause of action against the State or its agencies since
(ADEA); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l Inc., 991 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1109
(1994) (ADEA and Title VII).
187. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994) (providing suit only
against "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"). See Lollar v.
Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that because state agency and not individ-
ual state official is the program recipient of the federal financial assistance the Rehabilita-
tion Act provides no right of action against state officials); Mallet v. Wisconsin Div. of
Vocational Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, 1248-51 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that section 722 of the
Rehabilitation Act does not confer a private right of action). But see Estate of Alcalde v.
Deaton Specialty Hosp. Home, Inc., 133 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that doc-
tors at a public hospital may be sued individually under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act if they receive federal funds in their private practice).
188. Examples are the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 29
U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1994) [FLSA] and the Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 -
2654 (1994) [FMLA]. Both the FLSA and the FMLA cover employing entities (including
state governments) plus "any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an
employer." See FMLA Section 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I); FLSA Section 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(d). This language has been interpreted to permit private rights of action against
individuals. See Meara v. Bennett, 27 F. Supp. 2d 288, 291 (D. Mass. 1998) (adopting the
majority view that "[statutory] language clearly suggests that individuals are contemplated
as defendants under [the FMLA]" - collecting cases); Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F.
Supp. 2d 403, 412-413 (M.D. Pa. 1999) (identifying FMLA individual liability as the pre-
dominant view with respect to public employee supervisors - collecting cases); Bryant v.
Delbar Prods., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 799, 808 (M.D. Tenn.1998) (same); Dole v. Solid Waste
Serv., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 895, 923 (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("The overwhelming weight of authority
is that a corporate officer with operational control of a corporation's covered enterprise is
an employer along with the corporation, jointly and severally liable under [the FLSA] for
unpaid wages."), affd mem. 897 F.2d 521 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1024 (1990).
Contra Keene v. Rinaldi, 127 F. Supp. 2d 770, 774-79 (M.D.N.C. 2000) (holding that public
employee supervisors may not be sued individually under the FMLA).
In addition, the copyright laws provide a right of action against state officials in their
individual capacity. See Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)
("[A]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner's, that is, any-
one who trespasses into [the copyright owners'] exclusive domain by using or authorizing
the use of the copyrighted work in one of the five ways set forth in the statutes, 'is an
infringer of the copyright."') (citing 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)). Officials of state universities are
thus subject to individual liability arising out of copyright infringement. See Richard An-
derson Photography v. Brown, 852 F.2d 114, 122 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding public relations
director of state university personally liable for damages for copyright infringement: "[t]he
mere fact that [a party's] conduct was undertaken in the course of ... State employment
does not ... relieve [the party] of individual liability, even if [the] employer could not be
sued for it."). Accord Kersavage v. Univ. of Tenn., 731 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Tenn. 1989).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). § 1983 does not confer substantive rights; it provides a
remedy, that is, a private cause of action, for violation of constitutional rights and rights
created by federal statute.
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neither is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983.90 Nor can a § 1983 suit
for money damages be asserted against state officers sued in their official
capacities because such suit is no different from a suit against the state
itself.'91
It is true that § 1983 damage actions against state officers sued in their
individual capacities are available to enforce federal statutory rights.
92
However, the Supreme Court has concluded that plaintiffs may not enforce
statutory provisions through § 1983 suits in two situations: "where Congress
has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself and
where the statute [does] not create enforceable rights, privileges and immuni-
ties within the meaning of Section 1983.'
19 3
The ADA clearly creates enforceable rights, so the § 1983 cases involving
the assertion of statutory rights under the ADA have turned on whether
Congress implicitly has foreclosed enforcement of the ADA through a § 1983
suit for money damages brought against a state officer because the ADA
contains its own comprehensive remedial scheme. 194 The lower courts gener-
ally hold that § 1983 does not provide a cause of action against state officers
for damages arising out of alleged ADA violations because the ADA con-
tains such a comprehensive enforcement scheme. 195 Most courts similarly
190. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 70 (1989). See also
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990) ("Will establishes that the State and arms of the
State, which have traditionally enjoyed Eleventh Amendment immunity, are not subject to
suit under [Section] 1983 in either federal or state court.").
191. See Will, 491 U.S. at 70-71.
192. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980).
193. Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987).
194. A statute's remedial scheme may be "sufficiently comprehensive ... to demon-
strate congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983." Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 20 (1981). The pre-
sumption is that a § 1983 cause of action exists so the burden is on the party claiming it
does not. See Mallett v. Wisconsin Div. of Vocational Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, 1255 n.11
(1997). The Court has held that it would "recognize an exception to the general rule that
§ 1983 provides a remedy for violation of federal statutory rights only when Congress has
affirmatively withdrawn the remedy." Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509
n.9 (1990). Some lower courts have expressed the concern that permitting a § 1983 remedy
with respect to federal rights contained in statutes that contain comprehensive administra-
tive remedial measures that must be exhausted would permit plaintiffs to bypass those
administrative procedures. See Baumgardner v. County of Cook, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1041,
1050-51 (N.D. II. 2000) (discussing that concern and distinguishing § 1983 actions alleging
disability-based constitutional violations, reasoning that in those 1983 actions "the ADA's
administrative scheme is not being bypassed.").
195. See, e.g., Alsbrook v. Maumelle, 184 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. granted,
120 S. Ct. 1003 (2000), cert. dismissed on application of both parties, 120 S. Ct. 1265 (2000)
("ADA's comprehensive remedial scheme bars [plaintiff's] § 1983 claim against [state of-
ficers] in their individual capacities."); id. (ADA's comprehensive scheme "evidences a
congressional intent to foreclose resort to § 1983 for remedy of statutory violations."); Hol-
brook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that a plaintiff
may not maintain a § 1983 action in lieu of, or in addition to, an ADA cause of action if the
only alleged deprivation is of employee's rights created by the ADA); Meara v. Bennett, 27
F. Supp. 2d 288, 291-92 (D. Mass. 1998) (same - collecting cases). There is a minority,
contrary view. See Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa.
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reject § 1983 actions asserting rights under the Rehabilitation Act.' 96
Further complicating the ability to recover damages against state officers
in individual capacity suits is the doctrine of qualified immunity.
197
"[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reason-
able person would have known."'1 98 This qualified immunity doctrine
presents most plaintiffs with an insurmountable barrier to recovery.199
Official Capacity Suits: In Garrett, the Court acknowledged that plaintiffs
still have "federal recourse against discrimination [prohibited by ADA Title
2001) (finding insufficient evidence that the ADA's remedial scheme evidences a congres-
sional intent to foreclose § 1983 relief); Ransom v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 983 F. Supp.
895, 903 (D. Ariz. 1997) (allowing § 1983 action); Independent Hous. Servs. v. Fillmore
Ctr. Ass'n, 840 F. Supp. 1329 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (same). See also Wesley v. Vaughn, No.
CIV. A. 99-1228, 2001 WL 210285 at *4 n.8 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 28, 2001) (collecting contrasting
authority).
196. See, e.g., Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603, 609, 610-11 (5th Cir. 1999); Holbrook v.
City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1531 (11th Cir. 1997). But see Mallet, 130 F.3d at 1251-
57 (holding that § 1983 provides a private right of action to enforce the provisions of Title I
of the Rehabilitation Act.); Frederick L. v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp.2d 509
(E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding insufficient evidence that the Rehabilitation Act's remedial
scheme evidences a congressional intent to foreclose § 1983 relief).
As discussed supra note 121, even if § 1983 is not available to enforce ADA statutory
rights, it clearly is available to sue state officers in their individual capacity for disability-
based discrimination that amounts to a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
197. State officials may invoke either absolute or qualified immunity from personal
liability from damages. The immunity available depends on the official's functions. Offi-
cials performing judicial, prosecutorial, or legislative functions are entitled to absolute im-
munity. See Mereles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (per curiam) (judicial); Burns v. Reed,
500 U.S. 478, 486-96 (1991) (prosecutorial); Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Auth., 440 U.S. 391, 406 (1979) (legislative). Police officers serving as witnesses
also possess absolute immunity. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, at 500, 510-12. All
other state officials may assert qualified immunity. Id. at 513. See Richardson v. McKnight,
521 U.S. 399 (1997).
198. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
199. See Hartley, The Alden Trilogy, supra note 17, at 392-404. One study of all fed-
eral court cases over a two-year period found that the court sustained the qualified immu-
nity defense in 80 percent of the cases. See Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Cost of
Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L. REV. 123, 145 n.106 (1999). Id. at 124 (The "courts' almost
unfettered judgment [that] determines the outcome of the application of the defense.").
Many others have noted the near impossibility of overcoming the qualified immunity de-
fense except for the most battered plaintiffs. See Hartley, The Alden Trilogy, supra note
17, at 399 n.375 (collecting authority).
An optimist might argue that the threat the qualified immunity doctrine poses to the
§ 1983 individual capacity suit recedes somewhat when the alleged unlawful conduct by a
state officer constitutes unconstitutional conduct such as disability-based harassment or
retaliation, conduct that one would imagine is clearly unconstitutional. Pessimists, those
who have read dozens of qualified immunity cases that so overwhelmingly result in the
denial of the § 1983 claim, are not likely to have their fears quieted just because plaintiff
brings a disability-based harassment or retaliation action. Whether the optimists or the
pessimists prove more prescient must await judicial developments over the next decade.
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I] ... in actions for injunctive relief under Ex parte Young .... 200 Young
suits are the mirror image of individual capacity suits. They name state of-
ficers in their official capacities rendering the defendant state officer the
nominal party. The suit is really against the office held by the state official
being sued, making the suit one against the state.20 1 Young suits do relax
Garrett's grip to the extent they permit private plaintiffs to enjoin future vio-
lations of their Title I rights.20 2 But their usefulness in ADA litigation is tem-
pered by a variety of restrictions that need to be understood.
20 3
First, Federal courts have jurisdiction over a suit against a state official
"when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to 'end a
continuing violation of federal law."' 204 These suits may not be maintained
for retroactive relief, however, thus precluding suits for money damages.
20 5
The prospective/retrospective distinction is hardly self-evident, freeing the
courts to exercise considerable discretion. For example, the reason for deny-
ing plaintiffs the right to retrospective relief is to protect state treasuries but
it is clear that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Young injunction ac-
200. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 968 n.9. In Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman
(Pennhurst II), 465 U.S. 89 (1984), the Court held that the Young exception to a state's
judicial immunity under the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to prospective relief
based on state law. Thus the normal rules of federal supplemental jurisdiction do not apply
when the state is the defendant. In disability litigation, state claims will be severed and
dismissed. See, e.g., Dover Elevator Co. v. Arkansas State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 447 (8th Cir.
1995) (holding Young is "inapplicable in a suit against state officials on the basis of state
law" observing that "it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than
when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state
law.").
201. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) ("Suits against state officials in their
official capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the State.").
202. But the Young suit does not grant compensation for past wrongs. Nor does it
deter noncompliance until injunctive relief is granted. The Court's rationale is "[r]emedies
designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal
interest in assuring the supremacy of that law. But compensatory or deterrence interests
are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment." Green v. Mansour,
474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
203. One important limitation is that ADA plaintiffs suing state officials under a Young
theory will not be afforded a jury trial. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
A(b)(4)(c)(1) (jury trial only available to complaining party seeking compensatory or puni-
tive damages). See also Project Life, Inc. v. Glendening, 139 F. Supp. 2d 703, 707 (D. Md.
2001) (noting that absent a request for damages, no jury trial is available in an ADA
action).
204. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996) (quoting Green v.
Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)). See Deli v. El Torito Restaurant, Inc., No. C 94-3900-
CAL, 1997 WL 714866 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 1997) (denying injunctive relief in ADA Title
III action because only allegation was of a single incident of past discrimination and plain-
tiff unable to demonstrate continuing adverse effects.). Young suits remain suits against
the state for purposes of the state action doctrine but not for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment. This is why the rule has been referred to by the Court as a "fiction." See
Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 114 n.25 (1984).
205. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974) ("[A] suit by [a] private part[y] seek-
ing to impose [a] liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.").
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tions even if compliance with the injunction will result in substantial ancillary
cost to the states.206 The language of the law does its magic by characterizing
as "damages" those burdens on a state treasury that Young does not permit
while characterizing as "ancillary" those compliance costs Young does per-
mit. But what remedies are "ancillary?" In Hutto v. Finney,207 the Court
held the Eleventh Amendment is no bar to the "ancillary" remedy of attor-
neys' fees generated in securing a Young injunction.20 What about reinstate-
ment in an ADA discharge case? Is it prospective relief even though it is
ordered to remedy a past injury?209 What about front pay? Now that it is
clear that front pay is not subject to the ADA's compensation cap, 2100 the
remedy of front pay is likely to be requested more often. Should it be consid-
ered "ancillary" to the prospective relief of reinstatement because "courts
have ordered front pay as a substitute for reinstatement[?] '21 1 Garrett will
206. See id. See also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979); Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267 (1977). Ironically, the cost of future compliance often exceeds past liability. See
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 104, at 418.
207. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
208. A case decided the same term as Garrett, but eclipsed by it, is Buckhannon Board
and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services, 121 S. Ct.
1835 (2001). In that case, the Court held that because a state defendant voluntarily ceased
to engage in the conduct that was the subject of an ADA suit seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief, and thereby mooted the case, the plaintiff was not the "prevailing party"
eligible for an award of attorney fees. The predicate for the award of such fees, the Court
held, is either a favorable judgment on the merits or a settlement agreement enforced
through a consent decree. See id. at 1840. States desiring to avoid attorney fees are pro-
vided an incentive by Buckhannon to litigate up to the eve of an adverse judgment and
then attempt to moot the case through voluntary cessation of the challenged activity. The
Court in Buckhannon dismissed this risk because "petitioners' fear of mischievous defend-
ants only materializes in claims for equitable relief, for so long as the plaintiff has a cause
of action for damages, a defendant's change in conduct will not moot the case." Id. at
1842. But, of course, that is not very reassuring for public employees whose only cause of
action against the state after Garrett may be a claim for equitable relief in actions filed
against state officers in their official capacity.
209. See Isham v. Wilcox, No. 00-2177, 2001 WL 505235 at *2 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpub-
lished opinion) (holding that Young provides a federal court's jurisdiction to decide merits
of suit against the state in action seeking reinstatement to former employment position).
210. See Pollard v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 121 S. Ct.1946, 1948 (2001)
("[F]ront pay is simply money awarded for lost compensation during the period between
judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement.").
211. Id. Courts award front pay in cases in which reinstatement is not viable "because
of continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of
psychological injuries suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the discrimination ... " Id.
That front pay is compensatory in nature does not answer the question whether it is availa-
ble as part of a Young reinstatement order or in lieu of one. In Millikan v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267 (1977), the Court upheld a desegregation order requiring a school to implement
several remedial and compensatory aspects of a school desegregation plan. This portion of
the desegregation plan was found to constitute prospective relief. The Court noted:
The educational components, which the District Court ordered into effect pro-
spectively, are plainly designed to wipe out continuing conditions of inequality
.... That the programs are also 'compensatory' in nature does not change the
fact that they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about the
delayed benefits of a unitary school system.
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require the courts to determine more precisely the parameters of Young's
prospective/retrospective distinction.
Second, in its decision in Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court limited the
availability of Young prospective relief by inquiring into whether Congress
intended to provide it and finding an intent not to permit this remedy when a
statute contains an "intricate remedial scheme. '212 At least one lower court
has denied a Young remedy in an ADA case, citing this limitation found in
the Seminole Tribe decision.213 This clearly is the minority view, however.
214
Third, there is precedent for the proposition that Young remedies are un-
available for a different reason. In Walker v. Snyder,215 the court ruled that
the Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment is unavailable in an ADA
action because "a suit based on Young is a suit against state officers as indi-
viduals, not against the state itself. We [have held] that the only proper de-
fendant in an action under the provisions of the ADA... is the public body
as an entity. A suit resting on [Young] is not a suit against a public body and
therefore cannot support relief. '21 6 Walker was decided prior to Garrett,
which reaffirmed the availability of a Young remedy in ADA litigation.
217
One might anticipate that this guidance in Garrett will put Walker to rest -
Id. at 289-90 (emphasis in the original).
212. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74 n.17 (1996) ("We find...
that Congress did not intend [to authorize federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young in] the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act."). The court explained, "Where Congress has prescribed
a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created
right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action
against a state officer based upon Ex parte Young." Id. at 74. It has been suggested that a
logical next step for the Court could be to preclude a Young remedy except with respect to
those statutes containing a clear statement by Congress of an intent to provide it, see Vicki
C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex
parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 495, 530 (1997), or even to limit Young to constitutional,
not statutory, violations. See id. at 535.
213. See McGarry v. Dir., Dep't of Revenue, State of Mo., No. 96-4249-CV-C-66BA,
1999 WL 33204561 at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 1999) ("Based on the holding in Seminole Tribe
.... the doctrine of Ex parte Young does not apply to suits seeking to enforce a statute that
provides exclusive remedies within the statute [and] [t]he ADA contains exclusive
remedies.").
214. See, e.g.,. Gibson v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 265 F.3d 718, 722 (8th Cir.
2001) (rejecting the argument that the ADA's remedial scheme manifests a congressional
intent that no Young remedy is available in ADA litigation); Frazier v. Simmons, 254 F.3d
1247 at 1253 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that ADA Title I suits against state officials in their
official capacity for prospective relief survive Garrett but emphasizing that plaintiffs must
request such relief); Wesley v. Vaughn, No. CIV.A. 99-1228, 1999 WL 1065209 at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 18, 1999) (dismissing ADA claim for damages against state officials because of
state's sovereign immunity but denying motion to dismiss a claim against officers which
sought injunctive relief against officers in their official capacities); Berthelot v. Stadler, No.
Civ.A. 99-2009, 2000 WL 1568224 (E.D. La. Oct. 19, 2000) (dismissing all ADA claims
against prison officials in their individual capacities but holding that claims against them in
their official capacities are valid); Henrietta v. Giuliani, 81 F. Supp. 2d 425 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)
(upholding Young remedy in an ADA Title II action).
215. 213 F.3d 344 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1188 (2001).
216. Id. at 347.
217. See discussion supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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perhaps even in the circuit from which it originated. But more fundamen-
tally, Walker's reasoning fails because it misconstrues the distinction between
individual- and official-capacity suits. It may be that the ADA does not pro-
vide for individual capacity suits, as most courts have held.218 Young suits are
different. They name the individual officer but only nominally by naming the
officer in his or her official capacity as the incumbent in a particular state
office. These really are suits against the state, as the Supreme Court has
emphasized. 219 So understood, these suits for prospective relief should not
be precluded by the absence of a statutory cause of action against the officer
for damages when sued in the officer's individual capacity.
22 00
Finally, in its 1997 decision in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,22, the Court
denied a Young remedy because of the effect of the requested relief on the
state's treasury and governing autonomy.222 A minority faction on the Court
in the Coeur d'Alene Tribe case2 23 agreed with the result but proposed a ma-
jor overhaul of the Young doctrine, urging adoption of an ad hoc "balancing
and accommodation of state interests when determining whether the Young
exception applies in a given case. ' 224 To allay concerns of an "expansive ap-
plication of the Young exception, ' 2 2 5 this faction proposed restricting the ex-
ception to cases when "no state forum [is] available to vindicate federal
interests '226 or when a case presents an otherwise compelling need to vindi-
cate federal rights.227 Were this revision to be adopted, it would represent a
wholesale alteration of the role of federal courts in enforcing federal rights
against the states.
22 8
It would be naive to suppose that there will be no additional efforts to give
Young a cramped interpretation. Garrett, Kimel, and the Court's other Sec-
218. See discussion supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
219. See, e.g., Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) ("Suits against state officials in
their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the State.") (citing Ken-
tucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)).
220. See Randolph v. Rodgers, 253 F.3d 342, 348 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing the dicta in
Garrett and correctly explaining the difference between the individual capacity suit the
ADA does not provide and the Young-type official capacity suit the ADA affords).
221. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
222. Id. at 262.
223. Chief Justice Rehnquist, joining Justice Kennedy.
224. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S at 278.
225. Id. at 274 (citations omitted).
226. See id. at 291.
227. See id. at 278.
228. A balancing approach in the application of the Young exception is beginning to
take hold in the lower courts. The Fourth Circuit has noted:
In approaching the question of whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young permits
[injunctive relief against state officials], we begin with the recognition that the
scope of interests that Ex parte Young protects in preventing violations of federal
law must be carefully circumscribed so as not unduly to erode the important
underlying doctrine of sovereign immunity. . . [a]ccordingly, to determine
whether Ex parte Young authorizes [prospective relief] against State officials, we
must evaluate the federal interests served by permitting a federal suit against
individual [state officials] . . .[and determine] whether the federal suit would
unduly sacrifice the important value of [the State's] sovereign immunity.
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tion 5 cases increase the likelihood of Young injunctions becoming the rem-
edy of choice in private federal litigation to enforce federal statutory rights
against the States. The States, therefore, can be expected increasingly to re-
coil and call for Young's containment. The claim likely will be that unantici-
pated federal court litigation brought by individual litigants (even when
limited to injunctive relief) poses a continuing threat to the States' own or-
dering of their governmental processes and their fiscal autonomy, and indeed
threatens to deprive the States of the several blessings promised by the feder-
alism revival. 22 9 The competing concern, as I have attempted to demonstrate,
is that with the inability of individuals to enforce federal rights in either state
or federal court through suits for money damages, Young may be all that
keeps federal civil rights that are enforceable against the States from becom-
ing a mockery: a body of rights bereft of meaningful remedies.
V. LIKELY FALLOUT FROM GARRETT
Moving to a discussion of likely effects of a legal development is a bit like
moving from the hardpan to the swamp. The ground beneath seems unac-
ceptably soft as one moves away from the prescriptive and proscriptive and
into the predictive. But a case like Garrett calls for some prediction. I shall
limit myself to three areas: Garrett's likely effect on other federal statutes,
potential congressional responses to Garrett, and some fallout from the feder-
alism revival that could occur beyond the beltway.
230
A. Garrett's Likely Effect on Other Federal Legislation
The most immediate unanswered question following Garrett is its effect on
ADA Title 11.231 Actually Garrett left two Title II questions unresolved.
First, may public employees use Title II to litigate employment discrimina-
Bell At. Md., Inc. v. MCI WorldCom, Inc., 240 F.3d 279, 294-95 (4th Cir.), cert granted in
part sub noma. Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 121 S. Ct.2548 (June 25, 2001)
(mem.).
229. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,750-52 (1999), listed the following federalism values
promoted by upholding States' sovereign immunity: 1) States right to "order the processes
of [their] own governance . . ." Id. at 752; 2) protection from "an unlimited congressional
power to authorize suits ... [which] could create staggering burdens, giving Congress a
power and a leverage over the States that ... would pose a severe and notorious danger to
the States and their resources." Id. at 751; and 3) protection from "'unanticipated interven-
tion [of individuals] in the processes of government[,]'" thereby upsetting the premise of
democratic governance that judgments regarding the allocation of scarce resources be
made through each state's political process, "not by judicial decree mandated by the Fed-
eral Government and invoked by the private citizen." Id. at 750-51 (citing Great N. Life
Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944)). See also Alden, 527 U.S. at 750 (Federal govern-
mental assertion of control "over a State's most fundamental political processes ... strikes
at the heart of political accountability..."). Id.
230. Washington, D.C. has an interstate highway encircling the city that is referred to
as the Capitol Beltway. The phrase "beyond the beltway" refers to events and activities
that arise outside of Washington, D.C. and among non-politicians and persons who are not
government officials.
231. The Court explicitly left that question for another day. See discussion supra note
2. Title I bars disability-based discrimination in employment by both private employers
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tion claims or is Title I their exclusive remedy? If Title II is available to
remedy disability-based employment discrimination, is the Title I holding in
Garrett applicable to such Title II suits?
In Garrett, the Court acknowledged a split in the circuits on the question
of Title II's availability to remedy employment discrimination and chose not
to resolve the question.2 32 But the Court telegraphed its likely unwillingness
in the future to find a congressional intent to provide duplicate remedies in
Titles I and II for public employees to challenge employment discrimina-
tion.233 The statutory question aside, it is unlikely in any event that the Court
will find that Congress validly abrogated state judicial immunity by providing
a Title II remedy for employment discrimination when in Garrett it found no
such valid exercise of the Section 5 power when Congress enacted Title 1.2
34
But what about Title II claims other that those arising out of alleged em-
ployment discrimination? Is Garrett's Title I abrogation holding equally to
them? Garrett's rationale2 35 suggests strongly that the Court will find that
Congress did not validly abrogate state judicial immunity when enacting Title
II. First, if the Court segments its inquiry into the pattern of unconstitution-
ality as it did in Garrett, Title II likely will fail. 236 Congress did not attempt to
parse the systemic disability-based discrimination it uncovered when it en-
acted the ADA by making findings of a pattern of unconstitutionality with
respect to each of the major categories of government programs Title II cov-
ers. Even if the Court considers state discrimination in the provision of gov-
ernment services generally when evaluating the existence of the requisite
pattern of unconstitutionality, it seems problematic that the Court would
conclude Congress documented the requisite pattern of unconstitutional-
and public entities. Title 11 of the ADA deals with disability-based discrimination with
respect to "services, programs, or activities of a public entity." 42 U.S.C. §12132 (1994).
232. See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 960 n.1.
233. In Garrett, the Court made reference to Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16
(1983) ("[W]here Congress includes particular language in one Section of a statute but
omits it in another Section of the of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress
acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion . ) (citing United States v.
Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir. 1972).
234. Since the Court found that Title I does not provide a valid private right of action
against the States for money damages because Congress failed to establish a pattern of
unconstitutional state employment discrimination when it enacted the ADA, it follows that
the Court would reach the same conclusion with regard to a Title II claim for damages to
remedy employment discrimination.
235. See discussion supra Part 1lI.
236. In Garrett, the Court limited its inquiry into the pattern of unconstitutionality by
considering only evidence in the legislative record and congressional findings of unconsti-
tutional state employment discrimination. See discussion supra notes 78-83 and accompa-
nying text.
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ity. 237 Finally, Title II's overbreadth may be too excessive in any event 238 for
the Court to find it a congruent and proportionate response to unconstitu-
tional behavior by the states.239 When Title II does reach the Court, and the
Court gets a second bite at the ADA apple, one would hope, as I have argued
above,2400 that the Court might be willing to tell us why Congress lacks Sec-
tion 5 power to enact the ADA 1) when there are legislative facts showing a
pervasive pattern of unconstitutional disability-based discrimination (if one
includes the totality of state and local governments' behavior), 2) when Con-
237. In Garrett, the majority dismissed the many instances of discrimination noted in
the Appendix C to Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion, which he drew from ADA's legisla-
tive history, as "anecdotes" that "are so general and brief that no firm conclusion can be
drawn." 121 S. Ct. at 966 n.7. See Thompson v. Colorado, 258 F.3d 1241, 1254 (10th Cir.
2001) (holding that ADA Title II is not a valid abrogation of the States' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity because Congress' aim was "'to remedy the effects of benign neglect re-
sulting from the invisibility of the disabled' and that 'invidious animus . . . was not the
focus"' (quoting Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 1995).
238. Most of the state action regulated by Title II is not itself unconstitutional. A sam-
pling of cases provides a sense of Title II's overbreadth. A recurring issue is whether Title
II can be deployed to prohibit states from charging individuals with disabilities a small fee
for parking placards. Compare Brown v. North Carolina Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 166 F.3d
698 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding state sovereign immunity prohibits Title II from being used
against a state which is charging disabled persons for parking placards) cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 1186 (2001) (mem.) with Dare v. California, 191 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that
a surcharge for public service on only disabled persons is unequal treatment and contrary
to Title II's citizen parity protections). Title II regulations require a public entity that em-
ploys fifty or more employees to designate one individual to coordinate efforts and publish
grievance procedures providing for the prompt and equitable resolution of complaints. See
University Agrees to Implement Grievance Procedures, 17 Disability Compliance Bull.
(LRP) 24 (May 19, 2000). A mobility impaired plaintiff has prevailed on a Title II claim in
a case alleging that a university had failed to provide access to a botanical garden. See
Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000) (Title II imposes an af-
firmative duty to eliminate barriers that would deny access to individuals with disabilities).
Title II's accessibility requirements are extensive. One report concluded that as of 1995,
few of the 85,000 state and local governments had come into full compliance with Title II
accessibility requirements. See ADA Deadline on Modifications Passes - But Few Look to
Be in Compliance, 6 Disability Compliance Bull. (LRP) 1 (Feb. 2, 1995). In a class action
suit, persons with mobility impairments have gained a preliminary injunction under Title
II requiring a city to conform curb ramps to ADA requirements. See Deck v. City of
Toledo, 29 F. Supp. 2d 431 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
239. . See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 966 (citing the ADA's provisions for reasonable accom-
modation and prohibitions against work rules that have a disparate impact on persons with
disabilities and concluding they render Title I a disproportionate response); Garcia v.
S.U. .Y. Health Ctr. Of Brooklyn, No. 00-9223, 2001 WL 1159970 at *7 (2d Cir. Sept. 26,
2001) ("Title II [of ADA] is neither congruent nor proportional [in its entirety] to the
proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment [citing ADA's requirement that] a state make
reasonable modifications in its programs, services or activities ... [and concluding that]
Title II focuses on disparate effects divorced from any inquiry into intent."); Liberman v.
Delaware, No. CIV. A. 96-523 GMS, 2001 WL 1000936 at *4-*5 (D. Del. Aug. 30, 2001)
(holding abrogation in Title II invalid and citing similar post-Garrett holdings in several
other federal District Courts. Contra Project Life, Inc. v. Parris Glendening, 139 F. Supp.
2d 703, 703 n.5 (D. Md. 2001) (holding that Garrett does not control ADA Title II actions
and Congress validly abrogated the States' sovereign immunity when enacting Title II).
240. See discussion supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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gress concludes, based on those facts, that integration of the disabled into
society is the key to deterring and remedying the prejudice causing this per-
vasive pattern of unconstitutional discrimination, and 3) when the only effica-
cious way to integrate the disabled into society is to integrate them into all
segments of society, including all aspects of public sector services?
241
What about the abrogation provisions in other federal legislation? As
noted above, over the past six Terms the Court has found unconstitutional
each of the seven statutes challenged on the basis of Congress' alleged lack of
abrogation authority.2 42 It is fair to assume that this pattern will continue as
additional federal statutes made applicable to the States come before the
Court. James Pfander makes a salient point in this regard when he explains
that "Congress adopted many of the extant abrogations before Seminole
Tribe was decided [in 1996] and did not clearly address the Fourteenth
Amendment in the course of its legislative findings. '243 This failure to ad-
dress the Fourteenth Amendment could prove fatal now that the Court re-
quires evidence that overbroad legislation enacted pursuant to Congress'
Section 5 power must be shown to have been aimed at eradicating unconsti-
tutional conduct as evidenced by Congress documenting a pattern of such
unconstitutional state action. Many of the nation's civil rights statutes that
have been made applicable to the States could fail that test. Many already
are in trouble in the lower courts.
The damage remedies against the States provided by the Family Medical
Leave Act (FMLA) 244 are perhaps the most endangered. Even before Gar-
rett, most lower courts, particularly in the more recent decisions, had found
Congress lacks Section 5 power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity in
the FMLA.245 The Equal Pay Act (EPA) 2 46 has fared better.247 A strong
case can be made that the EPA should survive post-Garrett judicial scru-
241. See discussion id.
242. See discussion supra note 2 and accompanying text.
243. James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Fed-
eral Review of State-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REV. 161, 191
n.124 (1998).
244. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 - 2654 (1994).
245. See Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d 1094, 1095 (8th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases from
the 2d, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 11th circuits); Cohen v. Nebraska Dep't of Admin. Serv., 83 F.
Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (D. Neb. 2000) (noting that of the circuit and district courts to consider
the issue since 1998, all have concluded that Congress lacked power to abrogate states'
immunity from suit under FMLA); see also Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st
Cir. 2001) (holding that the personal medical leave provisions of the FMLA do not validly
abrogate state sovereign immunity, a result that is "consistent with that of every other
circuit that has addressed the issue" (citing cases)).
246. The Equal Pay Act, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d), was enacted in 1963
and extended to the states in 1974. See Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6.
247. See Comment, The Equal Pay Act As Appropriate Legislation Under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment: Can State Employers Be Sued?, 76 WASH. L. REV. 279-311, 281
(2001) (concluding that "lower courts have.., upheld the EPA as appropriate Section 5
legislation"); id. at 293-95 & nn.138, 143-44 (citing cases).
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tiny,2
4
8 though final judgment must await the next round of post-Garrett
litigation.
249
The constitutionality of the application to the States of the money dam-
ages provided by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 250 bears closer atten-
tion in the post-Garrett era than one initially might think necessary.
Somewhat surprisingly, the issue of Congress' Section 5 power to enact Title
VII has never been settled at the Supreme Court.251 The lower courts that
have considered the question of Congress' Section 5 power to enact Title VII
and apply it to the states have found Congress possesses such power. Most,
though not all, of these decisions are pre-Garrett, however.252 There should
be no difficulty establishing the constitutionality of applying to the States
248. The reasons are: 1) The EPA's scope is narrow: it requires equal pay for women
for work that entails the same skill, effort and responsibility as work performed by men; 2)
The pattern of wage discrimination between male and female jobs is one that is easy to
document since it is primarily a statistical demonstration; 3) States are much more con-
strained by the Fourteenth Amendment when engaging in gender discrimination than
when engaging in discrimination based on age or disability. Age and disability discrimina-
tion are subject to rational basis review. See discussion supra notes 60, 129-31 and accom-
panying text. By contrast, to withstand constitutional challenge, classifications by gender
must serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to
achievement of those objectives. Moreover, gender may not be used as an:
inaccurate proxy for other, more germane bases of classification. Hence, 'archaic
and overbroad' generalizations concerning the financial position of . .. working
women [do] not justify use of a gender line in determining eligibility for certain
governmental entitlements. Similarly, increasingly outdated misconceptions con-
cerning the role of females in the home rather than in the 'marketplace and
world of ideas' [are] rejected as loose-fitting characterizations incapable of sup-
porting state statutory schemes that [are] premised upon their accuracy.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
For the above reasons, the EPA has been held to "prohibit[ ] very little constitutional
conduct." Varner v. Illinois State Univ., 226 F.3d 927, 935 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121
S. Ct. 2241 (2001). Accord Cherry v. Univ. of Wis. Sys. Bd. of Regents, 265 F.3d 541, 553
(7th Cir. 2001) (holding that "the EPA essentially targets only unconstitutional gender
discrimination").
249. The early returns suggest that the EPA will survive a Garrett-type challenge. See
Cherry, 265 F.3d at 553 (7th Cir. Sept. 7, 2001) (holding Congress validly exercised its
Section 5 authority when enacting the EPA); Siler-Khodr v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr.
Ass'n San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 2001) (same).
250. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. (1994).
251. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), the case first establishing the abrogation
potential of Section 5, was a Title VII case. Fitzpatrick resolved the question of whether
the Eleventh Amendment bars a damage remedy against the state but did not litigate
whether Congress has Section 5 power to provide such a damage remedy in Title VII. 427
U.S. at 456 n.11 ("Apart from their claim that the Eleventh Amendment bars enforcement
of the remedy established by Title VII in this case, respondent state officials do not con-
tend that the substantive provisions of Title VII as applied here are not a proper exercise
of congressional authority under [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
252. See Reynolds v. Alabama Dep't of Transp., 4 F. Supp. 2d 1092 (M.D. Ala. 1998)
(stating Congress did not exceed its Section 5 power when it subjected the States to liabil-
ity for Title VII disparate impact claims of discrimination); Carman v. San Francisco
United Sch. Dist., 982 F. Supp. 1396, 1405 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (stating Congress possesses
Section 5 power to abrogate state sovereign immunity from Title VII claims in federal
court). Accord Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 255 F.3d 615 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that Con-
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Title VII's prohibitions of overt racial, national origin, and religious discrimi-
nation since each is subject to strict judicial scrutiny when litigated as a con-
stitutional issue. 253 Similarly, Title VII's proscriptions of invidious gender
discrimination also should survive a Garrett-type challenge because gender
classifications also receive heightened judicial scrutiny.
25 4
Much more problematic are the cases applying Title VII's prohibitions of
employment policies causing a disparate impact.255 The Court has held that
Congress intended to apply Title VII's disparate impact rules to the States
but has never ruled whether Congress possesses the Section 5 power to do
it.256 The post-Garrett disparate impact cases could be difficult to defend be-
cause state action causing a disparate impact on racial, gender, or other
groups is subject to rational basis judicial review, unless it can be proved that
gress validly abrogated the Eleventh Amendment for claims of disparate treatment and
impact on the basis of race under Title VII).
253. See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (stating that
because suspect classifications are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy, such classifi-
cations are subjected to strict judicial scrutiny and will be sustained only if the legislation
making the classification is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest).
254. . See discussion supra note 248 and accompanying text. In Maitland v. University
of Minnesota, 260 F.3d 959, 964 (8th Cir. 2001), the court even held that Title VII sex
discrimination damage claims brought against a state entity in federal court by male em-
ployees are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment because Congress validly abrogated
state sovereign immunity with respect to those Title VII claims.
255. Under some circumstances, Title VII prohibits employment policies that cause a
disparate impact on any of the groups Title VII protects. One of the more actively litigated
Title VII disparate impact issues entails rules that employees must speak only English.
These rules have a disparate impact based on national origin and the EEOC takes the
position that English only rules violate Title VII unless job related and consistent with
business necessity. This is the EEOC's theory in an action filed in the Spring of 2001. See
EEOC v. Beauty Enters, Inc. (D. Conn. Mar. 12, 2001) (reported at Dictating Spoken and
Written Language in the Workplace, 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 42 (March 29, 2001)).
There is judicial support for the EEOC's theory. See Gutierrez v. Mun. Court of Southeast
Judicial Dist., 838 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated by 490 U.S. 1016 (1989). See also
Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (resolving the allegations of unlawful
English-only rules requires a fact specific inquiry that considers the employer's unique
needs in each case).
Employment policies can also have an unlawful disparate impact on women. For ex-
ample, in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001) a district
court held that an employer's failure to include prescription contraceptives in its otherwise
generally comprehensive prescription drug plan violates Title VII. In another case, the
Seventh Circuit has suggested in dicta that an electric utility's refusal to provide bathroom
facilities to its female workers who work outside on power lines, may violate Title VII's
prohibitions on disparate impact. See DeClue v. Central I11. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434 (7th
Cir. 2000) (holding that policy does not constitute sexual harassment but suggesting it may
constitute unlawful disparate impact).
256. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (Employer's acts of racial discrimina-
tion in promotions, effected by an examination having disparate impact, rendered the em-
ployer liable, under Title VII, for racial discrimination suffered by employees barred from
promotion, even if the "bottom line" result of the promotional process was an appropriate
racial balance); Dothard v Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (Congress intended to prohibit
the disparate effect that the minimum height and weight standards had on female appli-
cants and apply those prohibitions to the states).
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the motive for the state action creating the disparate impact is invidious dis-
crimination against the group harmed.25 7 Plaintiffs seldom can meet this
test. 258 Accordingly, if the Court applies its normal requirement that Con-
gress may not exercise its Section 5 power unless it identifies a pattern of
unconstitutional conduct of the type the proposed legislation is regulating,
and if the Court requires that the required pattern be a pattern of unconstitu-
tional disparate impact state action, Title VII's disparate impact provisions
will not likely meet the test for the simple reason that there are virtually no
plaintiff victories in disparate impact constitutional litigation. There is an-
other option. The Court could conclude that, unlike the ADA, Congress did
identify a pattern of unconstitutional racial, national origin, religious, and
gender state employment discrimination and enacted Title VII to remedy and
deter it. And the Court could conclude that prohibiting employment policies
that have a disparate impact on these groups is an appropriate way for Con-
gress to remedy or deter the invidious discrimination Congress identified.
259
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),2 60 amended Title VII to define
sex discrimination to include pregnancy discrimination. This statute is appli-
cable to the States.261 It may be difficult to defend the PDA in a Garrett-type
challenge because of the Court's decision in Geduldig v. Aiello.262 There the
Court held that discrimination based on the status of being pregnant is not
gender discrimination. The pregnancy discrimination in Aiello thus was given
a rational basis review and held not to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
263
Since the Court holds that pregnancy discrimination is constitutional if ra-
tionally grounded, there does not exist a pattern of unconstitutional state
pregnancy discrimination. Given the reasoning in Garrett, and the absence of
a pattern of unconstitutional state pregnancy discrimination, it is difficult to
257. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (disparate impact
against women); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(disparate impact against the poor); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (disparate
impact against racial minorities).
258. For example, in none of the cases cited supra note 257 did plaintiffs prevail.
259. See, e.g., Okruhlik v. Univ. of Arkansas, 255 F.3d 615,626 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding
that applying the Title VII ban on disparate impact discrimination to the States is a valid
exercise of the Section 5 power because disparate impact racial discrimination is function-
ally equivalent to unconstitutional invidious racial discrimination and its ban, therefore, is
a 'prophylactic' response to achieve racial equality).
If the Court concludes that Congress does not possess Section 5 power to apply Title
VII's disparate impact prohibitions to the states, then those provisions will continue to be
applicable to the States but enforceable by private litigation only through a Young suit for
prospective relief. See discussion supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
260. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
261. See Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. and Univ. for Northeastern Ill.
Univ., No. 95-C2541, 1998 WL 748277 at *1 (N.D. 11. Sept. 30, 1998), rev'd on other
grounds, 207 F.3d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1187 (2001) (University
successfully challenged on sovereign immunity grounds the ADA's application to it but did
not so challenge the PDA.).
262. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
263. The State had refused to pay for pregnancy-related disabilities when its disability
insurance system paid for other disabilities lasting more than eight days but less than
twenty-six weeks. Id.
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see how the PDA's abrogation provisions will be found to be constitutional
as long as a majority of the Court clings to the holding in Aiello.
264
Finally, Congress has enacted many statutes prohibiting discrimination in
federally financed programs. Examples are: 1) Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act;2 65 2) The Rehabilitation Act of 1973;266 3) Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972;267 and 4) Individuals With Disabilities Education
Act (IDEA).2 68 As discussed next, Congress may possess authority through
the Federal spending power to induce the States to waive their sovereign
immunity by conditioning the States' receipt of federal funds on such a
waiver. But at least some of these statutes also are all enacted pursuant to
Congress' Section 5 power and those, therefore, need to be evaluated also
under Garrett principles.
B. Potential Congressional Responses to Garrett
A headline in a disability newsletter published soon after the Court's deci-
sion in Garrett proclaimed, "Section 504 is 'Next Battleground' Following
Ruling in Garrett Case. '269 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19732700
was enacted pursuant to Congress' Section 5 power as well as its spending
power. 271 Accordingly, section 504 suits raise Garrett-type issues as well as
the question of whether Congress may coax a state to waive its sovereign
immunity "voluntarily" as a condition to receipt of federal funds.
2 72
Incident to the Congress' spending power is the power to "attach condi-
tions on the receipt of federal funds .... ",273 One condition Congress might
set is requiring a state to waive its sovereign immunity. Section 504 does
that.2 74 It provides a private federal court cause of action for damages to
redress disability-based discrimination against "any program or activity" that
264. Again, as with disparate impact discrimination under Title VII, the Court could
hold that Congress did find a pattern of unconstitutional state employment discrimination
based on gender and that the PDA is an appropriate means to deter and remedy that
pattern of discrimination. See discussion supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994).
266. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
267. 29 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (1994).
268. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1998).
269. See Section 504 is 'Next Battleground' Following Ruling in Garrett Case, 20 Disa-
bility Compliance Bull. (LRP)1 (Mar. 22, 2001).
270. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
271. See Estate of Langan v. Nebraska, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1026 (D. Neb. 1999).
272. I will not linger discussing the likely outcome of a Garrett challenge to the Reha-
bilitation Act. Section 504's prohibitions are virtually identical to those in Title I of the
ADA. There is no reason to believe that the Rehabilitation Act's legislative history better
supports a pattern of state employment discrimination than does that of ADA Title I. See
Kilcullen v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 205 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2000) (suggesting that
the Rehabilitation Act's legislative history is less compelling than that of the ADA in terms
of establishing a pattern of State employment discrimination).
273. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
274. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (1994). So do many other statutes. See discussion supra
notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
20011
90 JOURNAL OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY LAW
receives federal financial assistance. 275 But section 504 covers only the indi-
vidual state agency or department that accepts or distributes federal funds.
2 76
Accordingly, section 504's waiver requirement is limited in the same way.
2 77
The Courts of Appeal generally are in agreement that the waiver of sover-
eign immunity that section 504 requires is a constitutional exercise of Con-
gress' spending power.
278
The Supreme Court has not yet ruled, however. When the issue comes
before the Court, opponents of section 504's waiver provisions are most
275. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
276. See Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.
Ct. 2591 (2001). ("[T]he State itself as a whole is not a program or activity. '[O]nly the
department or agency which receives [or distributes] the aid is covered.'. . .The acceptance
of funds by one state agency therefore leaves unaffected both other state agencies and the
State as a whole.") Id.
277. See id.
278. See Stanley v. Litscher, 213 F.3d 340, 344 (7th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases). A
panel of the Eighth Circuit reached a contrary result. See Bradley v. Arkansas Dep't of
Educ., 189 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 1999). That decision was later reversed en banc in a 6-4
decision sub nom., Jim C. v. Arkansas Department of Education, 197 F.3d 958 (8th Cir.
1999). But see Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Ctr. Of Brooklyn, No. 00-9223, 2001 WL 1159970
at *11 (2d Cir. Sept. 26, 2001) (not reaching the issue of congressional power to induce a
waiver of sovereign immunity through section 504, because court held that when state ac-
cepted federal funds it reasonably, though mistakenly, believed ADA Title II already had
abrogated its judicial immunity and, therefore, accepting federal funds cannot be under-
stood to constitute "knowing and intentional waiver" of sovereign immunity); Pugliese v.
Ariz. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 147 F. Supp.2d 985, 990 (D. Ariz. 2001) (not reach-
ing the issue of congressional power to induce a waiver of sovereign immunity through
section 504, because holding that section 504 does not place state program on adequate
notice that acceptance of federal funds constitutes waiver of sovereign immunity).
On the constitutionality of other congressional efforts to condition grants of funds to
the States on the States' consent to waive their immunity from suit see Cherry v. University
of Wisconsin System Board of Regents, 265 F.3d 541, 553 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding such
exercise of the spending power in Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 is consti-
tutional, rejecting the argument that since Title IX does not contain an explicit private
right of action, it cannot be understood to contain clear notice to the States that acceptance
of federal funds constitutes a waiver of state sovereign immunity). Accord Litman v.
George Mason Univ., 186 F.3d 544, 554 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1181 (2000)
(stating recipients of Title IX funding held to "clearly understand" two consequences of
accepting Title IX funding: "(1) the state must comply with Title IX's Antidiscrimination
provisions, and (2) it consents to resolve disputes regarding alleged violations of those
provisions in federal court.").
Though it is beyond the scope of this article, it is useful to note that in some cases the
court may not reach the judicial immunity issue with respect to spending statutes because
the statute does not contain a private right of action to enforce judicially the right being
asserted in the case. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049 (2001) (Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 creates a private right of action only with respect to the substan-
tive rights contained in section 601 of Title VI and not with respect to the prohibition on
disparate impact discrimination contained in the Title VI regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to section 602 of Title VI); Litman v. George Mason Univ., 156 F. Supp. 2d 579, 585
(E.D. Va. 2001) (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 creates a private right of
action only with respect to the substantive right contained in Title IX to be free from
gender discrimination by recipients of federal spending and not with respect to the prohibi-
tion on retaliation contained in the Title IX administrative regulations).
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likely to concentrate on two arguments. First is the assertion that the waiver
of sovereign immunity in section 504 is not sufficiently related to the pur-
poses of the spending statute that provides federal funds to the state agency
sued in any particular case. 279 In Jim C v. Arkansas Department of Educa-
tion,280O the dissent advanced this argument with respect to a state agency's
waiver of immunity from suit alleging disability discrimination as a result of
the agency receiving federal education funds. The dissent asserted that sec-
tion 504's waiver requirement bore no relationship to the purposes of most
federal grants to the states for education, namely to improve the overall qual-
ity of education. 281 Unless the Supreme Court holds that nondiscriminatory
treatment of persons with disabilities always is or never is related to the pur:
poses of most federal spending statutes, the Court will need to develop work-
able standards for measuring when the requisite relationship exists.
28 2
The second argument opponents of section 504 waiver are likely to deploy
is that the inducement to waive a state's judicial immunity with respect to
section 504 claims is coercive. The Supreme Court has recognized that finan-
cial inducement may "pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compul-
sion.' ",283 In South Dakota v. Dole, the States were presented with the choice
of raising the drinking age to 21 or losing 5 percent of the federal highway
funds to which the state was otherwise entitled.284 The Court held that put-
ting the States to that choice was not coercive because the States could sim-
ply say "no." Section 504, by contrast, threatens a 100 percent loss of federal
funding to any state agency whose state government does not agree to waive
its sovereign immunity for section 504 suits against that agency. In Jim C v.
Arkansas Department of Education, the dissenters found that a threatened
$250 million loss of federal education funds, representing twelve percent of
the Arkansas Department of Education's annual budget, was coercive.
285
The Supreme Court will need to fashion workable standards to determine at
what point "pressure turns into compulsion. '286 The federalism revival will
condition that determination because if Congress can achieve through its
279. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (noting that a conditional
spending statute is unconstitutional if the condition is not sufficiently related to the pur-
poses of the spending statute); id. at 208 (holding that the condition in federal highway
funding statute that states raise drinking age to 21 is directly related to safe interstate
travel, which is one on the primary purposes of federal government's expenditure of high-
way construction funds).
280. 235 F.3d 1079 (8th Cir. 2001).
281. See Jim C v. United States, 235 F.3d at 1085 (Bowman, J., dissenting).
282. One can imagine, for example, the difficulty in establishing relatedness in the
context of a disability discrimination claim brought in a section 504 suit against a state
agency receiving federal funds to support, for example, the operation of a state wildlife
sanctuary.
283. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
284. See id.
285. See Jim C., 235 F.3d at 1083 (Bowman J., dissenting).
286. For a defense of Congress' exercise of the spending power when enacting section
504 see James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism May
Affect the Anti-discrimination Mandate of the Americans With Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L.
REV. 91, 176-85 (2000).
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spending power all it has been denied in the recent Section 5 cases, many of
the States' rights "gains" achieved over the past several Terms of the Court
will have been for naught.
The outcome of spending power challenges to existing federal spending
statutes such as section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act will significantly affect
.congressional responses to Garrett and other congressional losses suffered in
the federalism revival cases. For example, the "Older Workers' Rights Res-
toration Act" was introduced in the Congress after the Court's decision in
Kimel. It requires states and state agencies receiving federal funds to waive
their judicial immunity in suits alleging violations of the ADEA.287 If that
legislation is a constitutional exercise of Congress' spending power then so
also is a "Disabled Persons' Rights Restoration Act" that uses the spending
power to override the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett. One suspects,
however, that the five Justices who have persevered over the past six Terms
to thwart Congress' abrogation authority will resist congressional efforts to
achieve indirectly through the Spending Power what this slim majority has
held may not be achieved directly through Congress' regulatory powers.
288
The upcoming spending power chapter in the federalism revival will indeed
be the next great battleground.
A different congressional response to Garrett might be an amendment to
the ADA that clarifies Congress' intent that the ADA creates a private right
of action for damages against the States to remedy disability-based discrimi-
nation that itself constitutes a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. I
have argued above that nothing in Garrett renders such a cause of action
unconstitutional and that it remains in Title I of the ADA after Garrett.
289
But language in the Garrett decision suggests that the Court may be of the
view that Congress did not intend that a private ADA Title I cause of action
for damages against the States based on allegations of invidious discrimina-
tion should survive the holding in Garrett that Congress lacks Section 5
power to enact the overbreadth in Title 1.2900 One therefore can expect
courts will resist the argument that Title I still contains a private right of
action for damages to remedy invidious discrimination by the States.291 Ac-
cordingly, Congress could amend the ADA to clarify its intent to preserve a
287. See ADEA Enforced Against States? 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 75 (June
21, 2001).
288. The academic literature provides a wealth of suggestions for modifications of the
Dole approach to the problem. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and
States' Rights, in THE SUPREME COURT'S FEDERALISM: REAL OR IMAGINED, THE ANNALS
OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 104 (Frank Goodman
ed., March 2001); Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending after Lopez, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1911 (1995). For a useful collection of contrasting views see Spending Clause
Symposium, 4 CHAPMAN L. REV. 1 (2001).
289. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
290. See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 128 (discussing Estate of Langan v. Nebraska, 63 F. Supp. 2d 1025
(D. Neb. 1999)).
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Title I cause of action for money damages to remedy unconstitutional disabil-
ity-based employment discrimination, notwithstanding Garrett.
292
Congress could amend the ADA in two additional ways to secure rights
for persons with disabilities. First, Congress could provide in the ADA a
private right of action for damages against state officers sued in their individ-
ual capacity. Such a right of action is constitutionally sound but the ADA
currently is interpreted as not providing it.293 As part of this ADA amend-
ment, Congress also could amend the standards for establishing qualified im-
munity in individual capacity suits, a change that is needed since the current
standards render individual capacity suits such a problematic option.294 Sec-
ond, Congress could amend the ADA to make unambiguous its intent to pro-
vide the remedy of prospective relief in suits against state officers sued in
their official capacity pursuant to the doctrine of Ex parte Young.2 95 This
would eliminate the risk of courts finding no such intent as a result of the
ADA's existing comprehensive remedial scheme.
296
C. Effects of Garrett Beyond the Beltway
It seems inevitable that state law prohibiting disability-based discrimina-
tion will be consulted increasingly by those seeking a damage remedy against
a state to remedy disability-based discrimination.2 97 Whether such state leg-
islation currently is available to state employees to combat disability-based
employment discrimination, and on what terms, particularly whether such
statutes provide for the recovery of adequate money damages against the
state, is a question that deserves a more thorough academic inquiry.2 98 How
292. A less surgical approach would be to amend § 1983 to include the States as "per-
sons" covered by the portion of § 1983 that creates a private right of action for damages for
violation of rights guaranteed by Fourteenth Amendment. This would reverse the current
interpretation of § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64, 70
(1989). It also would create remedies against the States for constitutional violations other
than just disability-based discrimination.
293. See discussion supra note 185 and accompanying text. Moreover, currently the
ADA is interpreted as precluding § 1983 suits for damages against state officers for viola-
tion of rights guaranteed by the ADA because of the ADA's comprehensive remedial
scheme. See discussion supra note 195 and accompanying text. The Congress could amend
the ADA to make clear its intent that § 1983 is available to enforce the statutory rights the
ADA provides through suits against state officers sued in their individual capacities.
294. See discussion supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
295. See discussion supra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
296. See discussion supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
297. See Section 504 Is "Next Battleground," supra note 269, at 1 (quoting Jonathan
Mook, a nationally recognized ADA lawyer, as emphasizing the "importance of 'dusting
off the state statutes' in light of the Garrett ruling.").
298. Final conclusions with respect to the adequacy of state law protecting state em-
ployees from disability-based discrimination by state employers must await thorough aca-
demic inquiry. The amicus brief filed in Garrett by the National Association of Protection
and Advocacy Systems and United Cerebral Palsy Associations, Inc. does a very good job
of summarizing state disability law as of 1990 when the ADA was enacted. See Brief for
the National Ass'n of Protection and Advocacy Systems & United Cerebral Palsy Ass'ns,
Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 2000 WL 1154037 (Aug. 11, 2000) (No. 99-1240). That brief demonstrates that
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states will respond to Garrett in terms of their own disability discrimination
law is one of Garrett's important unanswered questions.
299
Ironically, Garrett and the other Section 5 cases that are eroding the post-
World War II system of protective labor and civil rights legislation applicable
to the States could have the unintended consequence of energizing unioniza-
tion among public employees. During the 1970s, national labor policy shifted
from protecting group rights to protecting the rights of categories of individu-
als. 300 The ADA is a good example. While on its face none of the category-
based legislation was inconsistent with a commitment to protecting group ac-
tion, it nevertheless undermined it. Professor James Brudney has demon-
strated how the movement away from protecting group rights in favor of
individual rights evidences a loss of confidence in collective bargaining as an
institution, which in turn causes a "loss of legitimacy for unions as the en-
ablers of group action. This loss of legitimacy encourages the business com-
munity and the general public to erode and belittle the role of unions.
30 1
many states' disability discrimination laws provided considerably less protection than does
the ADA in terms of the availability of a private right of action to enforce statutory rights,
the definition of disability, the requirement of providing a reasonable accommodation, the
availability of compensatory damages, damage caps, coverage of mental disability, and cov-
erage of persons with a record of an impairment or those regarded as disabled. See id. at
15-26; id. at Appendix (describing for each state the limitations as of 1990 and today of
each state's disability discrimination law); see also J. Flaccus, Handicap Discrimination
Legislation: With Such Inadequate Coverage at the Federal Level, Can State Legislation Be
of Any Help?, 40 ARK. L. REV. 185, 261 (1986) (summarizing limits of state law protec-
tion prior to the enactment of the ADA).
299. A plaintiff desiring to sue a state on a federal civil rights claim by alleging, for
example, a Young ADA claim for prospective relief and also on a state law claim for dam-
ages cannot bring both actions in a single court against an unconsenting state. Pennhurst
State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) held that the Eleventh Amendment
bars a federal court from hearing state law claims against an unconsenting state pursuant to
pendent jurisdiction. ("[N]either pendent jurisdiction or any other basis of jurisdiction may
overrule the Eleventh Amendment."). Id. at 121. Alden precludes suing an unconsenting
state on a federal claim in the state's own courts. Nor does there appear to be any way a
plaintiff can toll the running of the state law statute of limitations while plaintiff files, for
example, a Young ADA action in federal court. See Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. Ray-
nor, 620 N.W.2d 680 (Minn. 2001), cert granted, 121 S. Ct. 2214 (2001) (No. 00-1514) (hold-
ing that the federal supplemental jurisdiction statute, which tolls the statute of limitations
on state law claims while they are pending in federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), violates
the Eleventh Amendment as applied to claims brought against unconsenting states). Ac-
cordingly, to benefit from both state and federal law, plaintiff will have no choice but to file
state claims in state court and simultaneously file a federal court action to assert federal
claims.
300. Since the 1960s, the national commitment for "group-based" legislation, such as
the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, seeking to advance worker interests through the
protection of group action, has given way to "category- based" legislation that "relied on
individual rights and freedoms while virtually ignoring group action." James J. Brudney,
Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1568
(1996); see also Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 177- 80 (1996) (discussing
"group-based" rules such as the Wagner Act and other labor relations laws and "category-
based" legislation such as discrimination laws).
301. See Brudney, supra note 300, at 1564.
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Moreover, category-based legislation signals that the collective bargaining
process is unable to address pervasive workplace problems.30 2 In addition,
the new employment legislation reduces the need for unions because it cre-
ates individual rights enforced by individuals,30 3 and in most of these statutes,
unions play bit parts or are cast as part of the problem. 3°4 In short, at some
point in the mid-1970s, the equilibrium shifted from legislation protecting the
group to legislation protecting the individual and concomitantly this shift im-
paired the ability of workers to unionize effectively.
Garrett raises the tantalizing possibility of reversing the trend away from
unionization that has been caused in part by the plethora of category-based
legislation enacted over the past thirty years. Now public employees no
longer can obtain a damage remedy for a state's violation of the minimum
wage or overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act,30 5 for a viola-
tion of the ADEA,30 6 or for violations of Title I of the ADA. Many other
civil rights and labor protection laws are in great danger of significant erosion
due to the principles established in the Court's Section 5 cases. 30 7 It has been
argued that a federal labor policy built around individual rights-based legisla-
tion risks giving American workers a false sense of security. 30 8 Will Garrett
clarify that false sense of security among public employees and reignite their
302. See id. at 1569 (stating that "[t]he need for a legislative solution revealed short-
comings in the collective bargaining approach"); see also Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The
Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and
the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 591-93 (1992) (summa-
rizing state judicial and legislative changes creating a "renaissance of rights for individual
employees" and concluding that "the emerging regime of individual employee rights repre-
sents not a complement to or an embellishment of the regime of collective rights, but
rather its replacement").
303. See Brudney, supra note 300, at 1570 (noting that "[e]mployees were now able to
pursue their own rights at little or no financial cost, just as they had relied on unions to
pursue their contractual and statutory rights in the past.").
304. Professor Brudney observes that under group-based legislation, unions play the
lead role in negotiating improved working conditions for employees, but under category-
based legislation, "the individual rights regime assigns unions cameo appearances or even
casts them as villains impeding employees' economic progress." Id. at 1571.
305. See Alden 527 U.S. at 712.
306. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
307. See discussion supra notes 1 - 12 and accompanying text.
308. See Susan L. Cater, The Case Against Proposals to Eliminate the Employment at
Will Rule, 5 INDUs. REL. L.J. 471, 471-72 (1983). The infamous 1989 Term of the United
States Supreme Court began eroding individual rights, which has continued under the re-
cent federalism revival. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989)
(limiting the coverage of the Civil Rights Act of 1870); Loraine v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490
U.S. 900 (1989) (interpreting Title VII limitations period to make recovery more difficult);
Martin v. Wills, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (holding that white employees who were not parties to
consent decrees have had their interests harmed); Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atone,
490 U.S. 642 (1989) (limiting the "disparate-impact" theory of recovery under Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (changing
burden of proof, making recovery under civil rights statutes more difficult). Congress was
required to remedy the harm done that Term, which it did, but only in part, in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981) (1991).
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interest in examining the possibilities of collective empowerment as an alter-
native to statutorily protected individual rights? You can bet that the men
and women who comprise the new generation of young, sophisticated trade
union leaders are asking that very question.
